

Wai 215, #B2

**The Tauranga Bush Campaign  
1864-1870**

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## Preface

My name is John Koning. I graduated from Victoria University of Wellington with a BA (Hons) First Class in History in 1988. Apart from some time spent travelling overseas, I worked as a Research Officer at the Waitangi Tribunal Division from December 1988 to November 1992. During this time I jointly authored a preliminary historical report on the Muriwhenua land claim and wrote exploratory reports on claims at Turangi and Te Poi.

In 1993 I joined the Crown Forestry Rental Trust where I am currently a Senior Historian with responsibility for forest claims in the Bay of Plenty. In 1994 I was the joint author of a submission on land loss and social deprivation in Muriwhenua. Earlier this year I wrote a series of articles on the historical background to the Tauranga claims for *The Bay of Plenty Times*.

This report was commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust on behalf of Pirirakau. Therefore, although the Tauranga Bush Campaign affected a number of other Ngati Ranginui hapu, this submission concentrates on the experiences of Pirirakau. It is hoped, however, that the historical overview contained in the report will prove to be of some assistance to other claimants.

I would like to thank my colleagues at the Crown Forestry Rental Trust for their assistance during the preparation of this submission, especially the research efforts of Tony Tumoana and the helpful advice of Vincent O'Malley and Philippa Wyatt. Special thanks are also due to the Pirirakau Claim Committee, and in particular, Jennifer and Peter Rolleston whose support and hospitality was always greatly appreciated.

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Memorial at Whakamarama

In the grounds of Whakamarama school at Te Puna there stands a memorial to the Pakeha soldiers who saw action during the Tauranga Bush Campaign. The bronze plaque reads, "Early in 1867 a Company of Auckland Engineer Volunteers campaigned on the Hautere Plateau. This stone was laid on 18 February 1967 to commemorate the actions of 15 February 1867 at Te Irihanga and Whakamarama in which these New Zealand Engineer Volunteers took part." There is no mention of the Maori warriors who opposed the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps on that rainy day in February 1867. While hapu of Ngati Ranginui do not require inscriptions set in stone to remember the sacrifices of their ancestors, the lack of public recognition is rather ironic, particularly since the memorial is situated in heartland of Pirirakau.

An emphasis on the deeds of Pakeha soldiers, and a corresponding neglect of the Maori warriors who died in defence of their land and people, has also characterised the historiography of the Tauranga Bush Campaign. For the most part, the conflict has been described as an isolated outbreak of aggression fomented by a band of wandering Pai Marire fanatics who happened to dislike surveyors working on land which belonged to the Crown. Such a situation could not be tolerated by the government which took the necessary steps to stamp out any protest and restore peace to the district. After receiving a lesson in the art of war from the brave colonial troops during a series of engagements in the Kaimai ranges, the cowardly rebels are said to have returned to their settlements in a chastened frame of mind.

## 1.2 The Tauranga Bush Campaign in history

In his two volume work on the New Zealand Wars, James Cowan viewed the Tauranga Bush Campaign as part of a wider series of conflicts between Maori and Pakeha that took place throughout the North Island between 1864 and 1872. These hostilities were described as 'the Hauhau Wars' in which the prophets of Pai Marire encouraged disaffected tribes to reclaim their former authority. "These priests", he wrote, "became so many Mad Mullahs advocating the doctrine of fire and tomahawk so strangely at variance with the title of the religion."<sup>1</sup> In the forests behind Tauranga there were

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<sup>1</sup> James Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars. A History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period*, vol 2, Government Printer, Wellington, 1983, p.4.

skirmishes between Pirirakau and other adherents of Pai Marire and a government force of militia and kupapa troops. According to Cowan, "the conditions of campaigning were difficult because of the very broken character of the country, but the Arawa friendlies and a few skilful colonials made conditions so precarious for the Hauhaus by seeking them out in their bush villages and destroying their crops that the little campaign soon convinced the rebels of the futility of active resistance."<sup>2</sup>

Pheobe Mielke argued that supporters of Pai Marire adopted an attitude of defiance towards Pakeha which inevitably led to armed conflict between the two races at Tauranga. She believed that Pirirakau were "by nature wilder and more ferocious than the Ngaiterangi and their natural ferocity had been doubled by their conversion to Hauhausism. Their opposition to white men, unlike that of the Ngaiterangi, sprang not so much from a definite grievance as from sheer, unreasoning, although perhaps not unreasonable, hatred of European encroachment."<sup>3</sup> However, a series of skirmishes in the bush soon convinced Pirirakau that fighting was a hopeless cause. According to Mielke, "this realisation, and not any accession of friendliness to the Pakehas, brought about a gradual diminishing of the guerilla warfare of the past year."<sup>4</sup>

In their centennial history of Tauranga, WH Gifford and HB Williams argued that the "extremism" of Pirirakau prevented the peaceful settlement of the district. They noted that "a wave of fanaticism having its origin in Taranaki, had swept through the Waikato and on to the East Coast, threatening to undo all that had been achieved. It actually led to serious trouble in many parts, and involved this district in considerable military operations a year or so later."<sup>5</sup> The government could not tolerate the increasingly violent opposition to the survey of confiscated land and had little option but to quash a rebellion inspired by the dogma of false prophets. In any event, "the Pirirakaus were an inferior hapu who had always been kept in a state of vassalage by the Ngaiterangis."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.153.

<sup>3</sup> Pheobe Mielke, *Early History of Tauranga Town and District*, MA Thesis, University of New Zealand, 1933, p.84.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p.85.

<sup>5</sup> WH Gifford and HB Williams, *A Centennial History of Tauranga*, Reed, Wellington, 1940, p. 277. See also KC Fenton, 'Centenary of New Zealand Army Engineers: Engineers in the Tauranga Bush Campaign', *Historical Review: Bay of Plenty Journal of History*, no.2, vol.4, pp.69-75; 'Royal New Zealand Engineers: Centennial Memorial at Whakamarama', *Journal of the Tauranga Historical Society*, no.30, 1967, pp.6-8.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 291.

### 1.3 Recent interpretations

A number of historians have recently provided more balanced accounts of the Tauranga Bush Campaign. James Belich described the conflict as a small scale campaign where British objectives were localised and Maori resistance was greatly fragmented. The general causes of the conflict were said to have been the process of creeping confiscation and the advent of Pai Marire. "In Tauranga," he observed, "while most Maoris held to the peace agreement of 1864, the tiny Piri Rakau hapu, led by the prophet Hakaraia, opposed the extension of confiscation into their territory by way of survey and settlement. At first, they did so by turning back surveyors unharmed, but when the government sought to arrest them, fighting broke out and continued from 18 January to 3 March 1867."<sup>7</sup> According to Belich, Pirirakau managed to evade several government expeditions, although their villages and crops were destroyed.

Hazel Riseborough blamed politicians in Wellington for the outbreak of the Tauranga Bush Campaign. She argued that "the underlying problems were not addressed. It was ad hoc government, government by expediency; the use of force, or the threat of it, was the main means of settling unresolved issues."<sup>8</sup> The continued interference with the surveys meant that a collision was inevitable. According to Riseborough, the resulting conflict was characterised "by brief exchanges of fire and massive destruction of rebel villages, crops and plantations on the edge of the bush outside the boundaries of the 'ceded' block or just within them." The justification for the policy of scorched earth was that Pirirakau were "unsurrendered rebels, unrepentant Hauhau, and that their claims to land and their stance in defence of home and crops heralded a general Hauhau uprising."<sup>9</sup>

Evelyn Stokes argued that Pakeha administrators failed to understand that the real role of Pai Marire was to reintegrate Maori society to accommodate Pakeha presence. She noted that "in the European view Pai Marire 'superstition' was synonymous with Hauhau 'rebellion' and had to be put down ruthlessly."<sup>10</sup> The military expected a fierce contest and systematically destroyed the settlements of Pirirakau and their allies. Stokes concluded that "the government excuse for the campaign claimed that there was a threat of a

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<sup>7</sup> James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1986, p.210.

<sup>8</sup> Hazel Riseborough, *The Crown and Tauranga Moana 1864-1868*, Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 1994, p.61.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.64-65

<sup>10</sup> Evelyn Stokes, *Te Raupatu o Tauranga Moana. The Confiscation of Tauranga Lands*, Wai 215, A2, p.133.

general Hauhau uprising, and that Pirirakau were Hauhau, unsundered rebels and aggressors. There is little evidence of this.”<sup>11</sup>

While such revisionism has provided a welcome corrective to the unbalanced accounts of the past, the Tauranga Bush Campaign remains something of an uncharted territory in the world of the New Zealand Wars. There has been no thorough examination of the actual engagements or the tactics employed by either side during nearly three months of fighting. Local officials are invariably identified as the prime instigators of the conflict even though a more senior member of the government was responsible for directing the campaign on the ground. The emphasis on the destruction visited upon Ngati Ranginui obscures the fact that armed resistance countered the extension of settlement for at least a decade after the last shot was fired in anger.

#### **1.4 The participants**

In most accounts the Maori participants in the Tauranga Bush Campaign are usually described as ‘Pirirakau’, ‘Hakaraia’s men’ or ‘Hauhau’. These descriptions obscure the participation of other groups in the conflict but unfortunately the written sources do not provide much assistance on this question. It is possible, however, to make some tentative suggestions.

The label ‘Pirirakau’ would have included the hapu of Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi together with some warriors from Ngati Porou and Taranaki. This group also contained men from Waitaha, Ngati Haua and Ngati Raukawa, and possibly, Ngati Rangiwewehi. This group mostly fought on the western side of the Wairoa river at Irihanga, Whakamarama and Waiwhatawhata.

‘Hakaraia’s men’ would have included Waitaha and Tapuika together with Ngai Tamarawaho, Ngati Hangarau, Ngati Ruahine and Ngai Te Ahi. This force fought between the Waimapu and Wairoa rivers at Taumata, Maenene and Akeake, although some men from Ngai Tamarawaho later joined Pirirakau at Whakamarama. Once again, a number of other individuals would have been part of this group, including Maihi Pohepohe of Maungatapu and warriors from Ngati Haua.

#### **1.5 Ngati Ranginui and the Crown**

The Tauranga Bush Campaign was the direct result of the policy of confiscation implemented by the government after the battle of Te Ranga in June 1864. The confiscated territory was to be located somewhere between the Waimapu and Wairoa rivers, but when the government discovered that there

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p.134.

was insufficient land within this area, the confiscation boundaries were further extended into the territory of Ngati Ranginui. At this time local Maori were living peacefully on their ancestral lands, and apart from Pirirakau refusing to surrender, the government had no real cause for concern. When the surveyors began to work beyond the accepted boundaries, the hapu of Ngati Ranginui initially sought to prevent the process of creeping confiscation by removing pegs and impounding equipment. The government responded by engaging the military to protect the survey parties, an act which local Maori interpreted as an unjustified invasion of their land.

The allegiance of Ngati Ranginui to the Kingitanga was undiminished when the surveyors started work on the confiscated territory. For instance, Pirirakau still deferred to Tawhiao and Wiremu Tamehana, and from the perspective of this particular hapu, the land remained under the mana of the Kingitanga. Although there is no doubt that the Pai Marire faith was an influential element during the Tauranga Bush Campaign, the Kingitanga proved to be the enduring source of inspiration for the hapu of Ngati Ranginui, and as such, the direct action against survey parties and armed conflict with the government was indicative of a wider search for political autonomy and the retention of tribal land. Indeed, the warriors of Pirirakau and the ploughmen of Parihaka had much in common.

An assessment of the conflict is required in order to demonstrate that the government was determined to establish a military settlement at Tauranga with little regard for those Maori who would bear the brunt of confiscation. As is well known, all the cultivations and villages of Ngati Ranginui were attacked during the Tauranga Bush Campaign, a strategy which suggests that the goal of the authorities was less the apprehension of particular individuals who had obstructed the surveys and more the complete subjugation of a tribe perceived to be insolent rebels. In fact, no surveyor came under fire whilst working on the extension of the confiscation boundary, and settlers were not subjected to random attacks. Ngati Ranginui sought a peace where their rights would be respected and a proper relationship with the Crown would be forged.

An assessment of the impact of the Tauranga Bush Campaign upon the hapu of Ngati Ranginui is also required as part of a broader consideration of the relationship between the Crown and Maori in Tauranga during the nineteenth century. It is generally believed that the scorched earth tactics of the government force inevitably led to the military defeat and social decline of local Maori. While there is no doubt that all the settlements in the Kaimai ranges were sacked by colonial troops, the fact remains that these kainga were reoccupied by their inhabitants. Moreover, the whole exercise appears to have been something of a failure for the government given that none of the alleged perpetrators were arrested and the enemy was not forced to surrender. There is no doubt that the hapu of Ngati Ranginui were able to



blunt the impact of a hostile invasion with appropriate tactics and astute leadership.

The consequences of war, however, cannot simply be measured in terms of military objectives. The colonial troops destroyed the homes and crops of a people whose actions were directed against an aggressive government which refused to negotiate the terms of settlement. For the current generation of Ngati Ranginui, the collective memory speaks of the unrealised search for tribal autonomy and the unjust expropriation of ancestral land. In this sense, the Tauranga Bush Campaign has never ended, and perhaps will only do so when chiefs like Rawiri Tata of Pirirakau and Penetaka of Ngati Rangi are also remembered in the grounds of Whakamarama school.

## 2. Confiscation and Pai Marire at Tauranga

### 2.1 The surrender of Ngaiterangi

After the victory by British troops at the battle of Te Ranga in June 1864, the Whitaker ministry was anxious to secure the surrender of the Kingitanga forces at Tauranga. By the end of the following month, the bulk of Ngaiterangi had surrendered to Colonel Greer, the local military commander, but some chiefs requested that the Governor, Sir George Grey, visit Tauranga in person to accept their submission.<sup>12</sup> At a meeting with Greer to discuss the terms of surrender, Enoka Te Whanake is reported to have said, "we do not wish the Governor to send a letter; let him come in person that we may see him face to face."<sup>13</sup>

Accompanied by General Duncan Cameron, who was visiting Tauranga for the first time since the disaster at Gate Pa in April, the Governor duly arrived at Te Papa in early August. He accepted the surrender of Ngaiterangi in the course of a series of meetings that lasted several days. "I regret that you should have committed yourself to evil courses which have caused so much misery to so many people", Grey told the assembled gathering, "but since you have done this, you have made the best amends in your power by the absolute and unconditional submission you have made to the Queen's authority, which submission is hereby accepted by me on the Queen's behalf."<sup>14</sup>

The confiscation of land had been the cause of considerable disagreement between the Governor and the government with the issue continuing to bedevil the peace negotiations at Te Papa.<sup>15</sup> However, Ngaiterangi were promised that they would only be required to forfeit a quarter of their land for taking up arms against the Crown. Grey said to Ngaiterangi that "to mark our sense of the honourable manner in which you conducted hostilities, neither robbing nor murdering, but respecting the wounded, I promise you

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<sup>12</sup> Riseborough, *op.cit.*, p.21.

<sup>13</sup> 'Reports Relative to Negotiations for Peace with the Ngaiterangi Tribe', *AJHR*, 1869, A-18, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup> 'Notes of Speeches made at the Pacification Meeting of His Excellency the Governor with Ngaiterangi Tribe at Te Papa, Tauranga, 5th and 6th August, 1864.' *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> BJ Dalton, *War and Politics in New Zealand*, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1967, pp. 174-205; Riseborough, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-25.

that in the ultimate settlement of your lands the amount taken shall not exceed one-fourth part of the whole lands."<sup>16</sup>

Frederick Whitaker, the Premier, and William Fox, the Colonial Secretary, remained in Tauranga after Grey and Cameron had departed for Auckland. They immediately commenced negotiations with leading members of Ngaiterangi about the cession of the Katikati Te Puna block, and a deal was concluded several weeks later when the chiefs accompanied Whitaker and Fox to Auckland to receive a deposit of £1000. From the perspective of the government, this arrangement would provide compensation to certain individuals for any inequalities which would inevitably result from the confiscation of a quarter of the Tauranga district.<sup>17</sup> However, no sooner had the chiefs returned from Auckland than the validity of the cession was contested by Ngati Ranginui, Ngati Pukenga and Ngati Tamatera.

Meanwhile, the government had determined, albeit on grounds which still remain unclear, that the land to be retained by the Crown would be located between the Waimapu and Wairoa rivers.<sup>18</sup> This decision had serious implications for hapu of Ngati Ranginui who would be singularly deprived of their ancestral lands, and the injustice of the situation was immediately apparent to local Maori. The Civil Commissioner for Tauranga, Henry Clarke, reported that "the Natives, after a little reflection, took exception to the proposition; they stated, with justice, that if it was carried out the punishment would fall heavily upon some, while others would not lose an inch of land, although equally implicated in the war, for instance, Ngatihe, Ngatihoko."<sup>19</sup>

After accepting the surrender of Ngaiterangi at Te Papa, Grey told the Colonial Office that Pirirakau had not submitted to the authority of the Crown. In an effort to extract compliance from Pirirakau, a proclamation was issued which outlined the terms and conditions on which a surrender would be accepted by Grey. The declaration stated that "the submission of men above referred to will be accepted on the same terms as the Governor in the name of Her Majesty has granted to those who have already submitted at Tauranga, provided they come in and give up their arms within twenty-one days from this date, and in event of their not doing so within that time, this promise will cease to be of any effect."<sup>20</sup> As loyal supporters of the Kingitanga, Pirirakau did not accept the offer to surrender, an early example of their consistent refusal to be influenced by the blandishments of the Crown.

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<sup>16</sup> 'Notes of Speeches', op.cit. , p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Vincent O'Malley and Alan Ward, *Draft Historical Report on Tauranga Moana Lands*, Crown Congress Joint Working Party, 1993, p.41.

<sup>18</sup> Stokes, op.cit., p.39.

<sup>19</sup> Clarke to Mantell, 23 June 1865, *AJHR* , 1867, A-20, p.12.

<sup>20</sup> Grey, Proclamation, 16 August 1864, *AJHR* , 1867, A-20, p.6.

## 2.2 The scheme of military settlement

Government officials considered the confiscation of land a necessary element in the Pakeha settlement of Tauranga. In October 1863 the Colonial Secretary, Alfred Domett, devised a plan for military settlers to occupy positions along a frontier from Raglan to Tauranga.<sup>21</sup> Men were to be recruited from the goldfields of both New Zealand and Australia to serve for three years before settling on free awards of confiscated land. Each soldier was entitled to a town allotment and farm section but remained subject to military discipline, and the failure on the part of any individual to comply with certain regulations resulted in the cancellation of their land grant. Grey justified the scheme to the Colonial Office by pointing out that the presence of military settlers in districts like Tauranga would deter the Kingitanga from engaging in any further campaigns against the Crown.<sup>22</sup>

By December 1863 three infantry regiments comprising some 3600 men had been enlisted under the scheme proposed by Domett.<sup>23</sup> After an initial involvement in various engagements in the Waikato, this newly established colonial force was despatched to the designated military settlements of Hamilton, Cambridge, Alexandra, Kihikihi and Tauranga. In May 1864 Grey asked Cameron to make suitable arrangements for the deployment of the 1st Waikato Regiment at Tauranga. "I will state for your consideration", wrote the Governor, "that the intention is that military settlers should be employed at any post in the same manner as other troops are, that they should always be available for military service, but that the Officer in Command should be authorised to employ them when not required for military duties, in preparing land for occupation, in order to facilitate their future settlement."<sup>24</sup>

By the middle of 1864 nearly 600 men of the 1st Waikato Regiment had landed at Te Papa to assume responsibility for the defence of Tauranga after the departure of the imperial troops. They garrisoned the four redoubts in the area and built small houses close to the main camp at Te Papa. The military settlers were provided with temporary sites, and the government, anxious to establish a permanent township as soon as possible, authorised the survey of town sections. Archdeacon Alfred Brown, the CMS missionary who had purchased the Te Papa peninsula from local Maori in the late 1830s, was outraged to find surveyors at work on the land. In a protest letter to Grey he complained that "the properties of the CMS at this place are under the

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<sup>21</sup> Domett, Memorandum, 5 October 1863, *AJHR*, 1863, A-8a.

<sup>22</sup> Grey to Newcastle, 29 August 1863, *AJHR*, 1863, A-8, p.1.

<sup>23</sup> 'Return of Militia, Volunteers, Military Police, and Other Forces (Exclusive of Regular Troops) in New Zealand, Made Up to 31st December, 1863', *AJHR*, 1864, E-3, p.34.

<sup>24</sup> Grey to Cameron, 19 May 1864, cited in Stokes, *op.cit*, p. 45.

direction and management of a Land Board appointed by the Socy. As a member of that Board I desire to record my protest against locating the Mily. Settlers on the Mission Station until the permiss. of the Socy. has been obtained."<sup>25</sup>

According to Brown, the CMS held Te Papa on trust for the benefit of local Maori, a position deemed incompatible with the proposed allocation of land to soldiers. Although Brown was supported by others in the CMS, including William Williams, the influential Bishop of Waiapu, the government was determined to secure the ownership of Te Papa either by voluntary cession or compulsory acquisition. By late 1864 the issue had still not been resolved, but with the recent appointment of the Weld ministry, the CMS was hopeful that the land would not simply be confiscated. "The Society speaks decidedly," Williams informed Brown, "and I do not suppose that under the present aspect of affairs the Government will attempt to take it. Your protest against the occupation of the land I think was good, though it would have little weight if the former ministers had been able to carry out their wishes."<sup>26</sup> However, the CMS eventually agreed to transfer the Te Papa block to the Crown. Under an agreement finalised in 1867, the CMS ceded four-fifths of the land without compensation and retained the remaining one-fifth in scattered holdings.<sup>27</sup>

The government also took steps to ensure that the farm sections would eventually become available to the military settlers by authorising the survey of land between the Waimapu and Wairoa rivers. In September 1864 the Provincial Surveyor, Theophilus Heale, arrived in Tauranga to plan and direct the necessary work. He found "the Natives everywhere near the coast in the full expectation that all the available land in the front would be immediately surveyed for occupation by Military Settlers." However, the surveys started rather slowly, and by the end of the year only limited progress had been made toward charting the coastline and surveying some smallholdings for privates and sergeants at Otumoetai and Waimapu.<sup>28</sup>

### 2.3 The Arrival of Pai Marire in Tauranga

In December 1864 the founder of Pai Marire, the Taranaki prophet Te Ua, sent a representative to Tauranga.<sup>29</sup> Although local Maori were already aware of

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<sup>25</sup> Brown to Grey, 5 August 1864, cited in Vincent O'Malley, *The Te Papa Block : A History of Church Missionary Society and Crown Dealings 1838-1867*, Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 1996, p.66.

<sup>26</sup> Willaims to Brown, 20 December 1864, cited in Vincent O'Malley, *op.cit.*, p.73.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p.

<sup>28</sup> Heale to Haultain, 7 April 1865, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.8.

<sup>29</sup> Paul Clark, 'Hauhau'. *The Pai Marire Search for Maori Identity*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, p.28.

this syncretic movement, the arrival of Tiu Tamehana in the district provided the impetus for a more intense interest in Pai Marire. Later that month Hori Tupaea, a leading chief of Ngaiterangi, urged people to attend a meeting where the tenets of the faith would be fully explained by the emissary from Ngati Haua. After a church service on Christmas Day most members of Ngaiterangi suddenly left their villages to listen to Tiu Tamehana. They joined Ngati Ranginui in the Kaimai ranges to hear the message of the new faith.

The haste of the departure alarmed government officials in Tauranga who were not convinced of the 'good and peaceful' intentions of Pai Marire. Henry Rice, the Official Interpreter, was unimpressed by assurances that Ngaiterangi would return to their villages within a fortnight. He wrote that "the declaration that the movement is not an hostile one remains to be seen. The fact of their having joined such a force plainly shows a real desire to recover their land by any means."<sup>30</sup> Clarke was equally suspicious of the arrival of Pai Marire in Tauranga: "I am further persuaded that this strange religion is gaining fresh adherents every day. Should any temporary success meet their hostile operations against us, it is impossible to say what the result might be amongst a people so proverbially superstitious and fanatical."<sup>31</sup>

In a similar vein, newspapers carried exaggerated reports of the spread of a violent creed from Taranaki to the Bay of Plenty which they believed would inevitably result in clashes between Pakeha and Maori. "There is one thing quite evident," a local correspondent reported, "that if the 'tohunga' declares war, which there is not the slightest doubt that he will do, the whole tribe will rise en masse and endeavour to drive us into the sea."<sup>32</sup>

Contrary to the initial expectations of Rice, most members of Ngaiterangi had returned to their villages by late January 1865. Earlier in the month, Clarke and Rice, accompanied by a small group of chiefs, had travelled to the Kaimai ranges in order to persuade people to renounce Pai Marire. According to *The New Zealander*, "the indefatigable exertions of these gentlemen managed ultimately to thwart the false and ridiculous ideas that had been implanted by the imposter Pai Marire."<sup>33</sup> Although the influence of Clarke and his companions over the course of events was no doubt greatly exaggerated, the reasons why the bulk of Ngaiterangi did not fully embrace Pai Marire remain somewhat obscure. Some individuals may have been disappointed that they did not meet Tiu Tamehana as expected, while others were probably troubled by some of the core beliefs of the religion.

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<sup>30</sup> Rice to Mantell, 28 December 1864, *BPP*, vol.14, p.264.

<sup>31</sup> Clarke to Fox, 14 November 1864, *AJHR*, 1864, E-8, p.5.

<sup>32</sup> *The New Zealander*, 5 January 1865, cited in Stokes, *op. cit.*, p.76.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p.78.

The influence of Pai Marire in Tauranga did not cease when most members of Ngaiterangi returned to their villages. For the most part, the hapu of Ngati Ranginui located to the west of Te Papa remained adherents after returning to their coastal settlements from the Kaimai ranges in early February 1865. As Rice noted, "they have in some cases brought with them the determination to continue the worship to their 'Niu' or 'Atua', and in one, that of the Piri Rakau tribe, positively declined giving it up, asserting that if compelled to do so, their intention is to return to their mountain camps again."<sup>34</sup>

Hori Tupaea continued to assist Tui Tamehana with his work in the area, but together with a large group of followers, they were both captured by Ngati Pikiao at Rotoiti while on their way to visit Kereopa, another Pai Marire emissary, in the Urewera. <sup>35</sup> Most of the party were released upon arrival at Maketu, with the more important prisoners being detained on the orders of Clarke and Greer. Although claiming that he was not an adherent of Pai Marire and had simply acted as an escort out of courtesy to Tui Tamehana, Hori Tupaea was arrested and then released on a bond of good behaviour. His eight companions, however, did not receive such lenient treatment and were incarcerated in the Monmouth redoubt.<sup>36</sup>

The captives were subsequently transferred to Auckland where Hori Tupaea was once again granted parole while the other men were committed for trial on a charge of endeavouring to incite rebellion.<sup>37</sup> The authorities were convinced that the punishment of these men would effectively dampen any remaining interest in Pai Marire at Tauranga. In the words of Grey, "I have no doubt that the example of the submission of Tupaea to Her Majesty's authority will exercise a very considerable and favourable influence upon many persons of the Native race."<sup>38</sup> This confidence proved to be somewhat misplaced as many individuals continued to be guided by Pai Marire. As Clarke reported, "many of the natives who have returned to their homes have brought with them their Pai Marire worship, and they practice it in spite of all remonstrance."<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Heale noted that "the Pirirakau, and other outlying hapus, have adoped the Pai Marire faith (but without any offensive disposition)."<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Rice to Mantell, 6 February 1865, *AJHR*, E-4, p.15.

<sup>35</sup> James Cowan, *op.cit.*, p.79.

<sup>36</sup> Greer to Deputy Quartermaster-General, 11 February 1865, *AJHR*, 1865, A-5, p.11; Smith to Grey, 13 February 1865, *AJHR*, 1865, A-5, p.13.

<sup>37</sup> Grey to Cardwell, 10 March 1865, *AJHR*, 1865, A-5, p.8.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Clarke to Mantell, 4 February 1865, *AJHR*, 1865, E-4, p.14.

<sup>40</sup> Heale, Memorandum, 27 June 1865, *AJHR*, 1865, A-20, p.14.

## 2.4 A millenarian movement

The particular appeal of Pai Marire to hapu of Ngati Ranginui once afforded a relatively simple explanation. Hostile settlers invariably characterised the religion as a return to the superstitions of the past. A newspaper correspondent thought that Maori in Tauranga had become "perfectly mad from the effects of Pai Marire fanaticism, and the assurances of victory they are expecting from Te Hoi and his disciples."<sup>41</sup> Local officials also viewed Pai Marire as a recrudescence of primitive fanaticism. Rice believed that "the terror, the utter carelessness of consequences, the determined aspect of fanaticism about the whole affair is astonishing."<sup>42</sup>

Later writers hinted at a slightly greater awareness of the attraction of the religion to Maori but echoed the views of contemporary observers that the virulent opposition to Pakeha was the result of a descent into blind savagery.<sup>43</sup> According to Cowan, "no Mohammedan leader preaching a jihad against the infidels was more fiercely passionate in his denunciation of the aliens than were the chief apostles of Hauhauism."<sup>44</sup> Similarly, Gifford and Williams concluded that Pai Marire was "the natural product of the impact of undigested Old Testament theology on highly superstitious, priest-dominated, blood-thirsty mentalities."<sup>45</sup>

This crude interpretation of Pai Marire has recently been subjected to criticism from historians. For instance, Paul Clark has argued that the religion was a predominantly peaceful adjustment cult determined to reinforce the separate identity of Maori: "pacifism and cultural syncretism, not rifles and reversion, were the prophet's means."<sup>46</sup> Similarly, Evelyn Stokes concluded that "the real role of Pai Marire as an expression of Maori identity, an effort to reintegrate Maori society to accommodate Pakeha presence, was not perceived. European settler reaction to Pai Marire 'superstition' and Hauhau 'rebellion' (the terms were synonymous) was little short of hysterical."<sup>47</sup>

The peaceable message of Te Ua appears to have reached Ngati Ranginui and Ngaiterangi uncorrupted by any sort of reinterpretation and the most significant feature of Pai Marire in Tauranga was the exaggerated millenarian vision which was apparently absent in other areas.<sup>48</sup> One reason for such a

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<sup>41</sup> *The New Zealander*, 5 January 1865, cited in Stokes, op. cit., p.74.

<sup>42</sup> Rice to Mantell, *BPP*, vol.14, p.264.

<sup>43</sup> Vincent O'Malley, *East Coast Confiscation Legislation and Its Implementation*, Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 1994, p 21.

<sup>44</sup> Cowan, op.cit., p.4.

<sup>45</sup> Gifford and Williams,

<sup>46</sup> Clark, op.cit., p.30

<sup>47</sup> Stokes, op.cit., p.88.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p.29.



pronounced emphasis on a sudden deliverance may have been the ambiguity surrounding the confiscation of land at Tauranga. As Clark pointed out, "these circumstances may have encouraged a high degree of uncertainty and a proclivity towards rapid, climactic solutions to the problems of war at Tauranga."<sup>49</sup>

While this analysis provides a reasonably convincing explanation of the initial appeal of Pai Marire to Maori in Tauranga, the reasons behind the subsequently quite different reactions of Ngati Ranginui and Ngaiterangi remain somewhat obscure. Derby has suggested that Maori who had few associations with Pakeha were more likely to be supporters of Pai Marire than those who had more direct links with local settlers.<sup>50</sup> She compared the position of hapu of Ngati Ranginui and Ngaiterangi in coastal settlements with Pirirakau who occupied more remote inland areas. This analysis fails to take into account the fact that many members of Ngati Ranginui who lived on the coast remained adherents of Pai Marire and that Pirirakau had been in reasonably close contact with Pakeha such as French missionaries and visiting traders prior to the outbreak of hostilities.<sup>51</sup>

## 2.5 Pai Marire and the Kingitanga

An enduring allegiance to the Kingitanga was probably more influential in determining support for Pai Marire than some strategic decision not to jeopardise opportunities for trade. During the Taranaki and Waikato campaigns Ngati Ranginui sent a number of contingents to join the Kingitanga forces on the front, and even after the surrender of Ngaiterangi at Te Papa, the influence of the movement remained strong in Tauranga. The conversion of Tawhiao would have strengthened the connection between the Kingitanga and Pai Marire, and the rather equivocal reaction of Wiremu Tamehana does not appear to have dissuaded Pirirakau and other hapu from becoming adherents of the religion.

In other parts of the country there was no neat link between supporting the Kingitanga and embracing Pai Marire, even after the conversion of Tawhiao, but the experience of Tauranga demonstrated that in some areas at least the two movements were virtually indistinguishable. The advent of Pai Marire provided the impetus for a renewal of the Kingitanga, with opposition to confiscation and land alienation both a political statement and an act of faith. The link between the Kingitanga and Pai Marire was noticed by Clarke who observed that "those Natives who did not remain faithful to the Maori King,

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p.30.

<sup>50</sup> Beth Derby, 'Maori Land Ownership in Tauranga County', MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 1981, pp.47-48.

<sup>51</sup> P Rolleston et al, *Te Raupatu o Te Pirirakau*, Tauranga, 1997, pp.37-41.

nor become believers in the 'Pai Marire' religion, should be involved in one common ruin with the Pakeha."<sup>52</sup>

In political terms, then, the decision to join Pai Marire represented the desire of Ngati Ranginui to retain control of their own land and destiny. Clarke noted that Pai Marire was the national Maori religion with Tawhiao as the acknowledged leader. The "objects and tendencies" of Pai Marire were therefore "inimical to the Queen's Government."<sup>53</sup> The decision to join Pai Marire did not, however, necessarily involve a wholesale repudiation of all aspects of Pakeha settlement. In early 1865 Rice recorded that some local adherents were "now fain to build their hopes on the god's promise of their shortly acquiring a knowledge of arts, sciences, and manufactures; for the latter (to them the principal) they anxiously look forward so that they may be able to make shoes, blankets and trouser, &c., like Europeans, and above all speak English."<sup>54</sup>

The attitude of the government to Pai Marire is best expressed in the proclamation issued by Grey during the aftermath of the execution of the Reverend Carl Volkner at Opotiki in late February 1865. The proclamation, which appeared in the *New Zealand Gazette* on 22 April 1865, condemned Pai Marire as a "fanatical sect" whose followers "engaged in practices subversive of all order and morality". The Governor resolved to "resist and suppress, by force of arms if necessary, and by every other means in my power, fanatical doctrines, rites and practices of the aforesaid character". Any persons "convicted of instigating, or participating in, such atrocities and crimes" would be punished "whenever they may be apprehended". As Vincent O'Malley has pointed out, this proclamation was "a clear declaration on the part of the Crown that the Pai Marire religion was not to be tolerated under any circumstances - and an open invitation to those subjects who also opposed it to do so actively."<sup>55</sup>

Clarke immediately recognised that the proclamation provided the necessary authorisation for any punitive expedition against Pai Marire followers in Tauranga. In May 1865 he observed that "the Arawa now have an authority (I will not give an opinion as to legality of the proclamation) for pitching into their troublesome neighbours "provided that they can satisfy themselves as to their holding 'fanatical Doctrine'." He considered writing to "Colonel Greer enclosing a copy of the Proclamation and asking him what assistance

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<sup>52</sup> Clarke to Fox, 14 November 1864, *AJHR*, 1864, E-8, p.5.

<sup>53</sup> Clarke, 'Report on the State of the Natives at the Time of Sir GF Bowen's Arrival', 7 March 1868, *AJHR*, A-4, p.10.

<sup>54</sup> Rice to Mantell, 6 February 1865, *AJHR*, E-4, p.15.

<sup>55</sup> Vincent O'Malley, *The Crown and Ngati Ruapani: Confiscation and Land Purchase in the Wairoa-Waikaremoana Area, 1865-1875*, Wellington, 1994, p.23.

he is prepared to give in the event of a stand up resistance on the part of cantankerous individuals."<sup>56</sup>

Greer had in fact already predicted that some sort of armed conflict may take place in Tauranga. In December 1864 he reported that "the same power that induced them to forget their promise [of allegiance] and go out and join the enemy, leaving their crops standing, will have little difficulty in persuading them to take up arms." Greer concluded that "the remarkable secrecy, and the close and general combination, shown in this movement, can only lead to the conclusion that they have been brought out for that purpose."<sup>57</sup> As Clark noted, "millenarian urgency continued to be confused with martial preparation."<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Clarke to Smith, 12 May 1865, cited in Evelyn Stokes, 'Pai Marire and Raupatu at Tauranga', *New Zealand Journal of History*, no.1, vol.31, 1997, p.61.

<sup>57</sup> Greer to Deputy Quartermaster General, 26 December 1864, cited in Clark, *op.cit.*, p.30.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

### 3. Extension of the Confiscation Boundary

#### 3.1 Intervention of Wiremu Tamehana

Apart from the potential threat of Pai Marire, a matter of considerable concern to local officials was the survey of Tauranga. In respect of the confiscated territory, the problem was partly caused by the failure of the government to make the necessary arrangements for Tauranga to become subject to the provisions of the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863. In June 1865 Heale lamented that the government had not taken any further steps to "assume possession of the land, or to adjudicate upon it, or even define its status by proclamation."

By this time Wiremu Tamehana had taken a more active interest in events at Tauranga. According to Heale, the Ngati Haua chief initially had no objection to the survey of land to the west of the Wairoa river, but he subsequently changed his mind and wrote to Greer objecting to the proposed settlement of Te Puna. The intervention of such an influential figure in the Kingitanga was not welcomed by Ngaiterangi. In June 1865 Clarke reported that "Wiremu Tamehana a short time since wrote a letter to Colonel Greer protesting against occupation of Te Puna, that letter was read by the Tauranga Natives, and they indignantly ignored his right to interfere in the matter." Moreover, he was supposed to have protested "at the instance of some of the Pirirakau tribe (Tauranga), who have never made their submission."<sup>59</sup>

Another factor which interrupted the survey of Tauranga was the physical presence of Ngati Ranginui on the land which was intended for the military settlement. Heale encountered a significant amount of opposition from local Maori whilst working in Tauranga during late 1864 and early 1865. He reported that "his camp was frequently visited by the Natives still in arms, against who he had no protection whatever." Heale thus had contact with the allegedly savage adherents of Pai Marire, who, given their propensity for random violence, seem to have behaved with remarkable restraint when visiting the Provincial Surveyor. Heale added that "when William Thompson Te Waharoa warned the writer not to extend his surveys inland, he had no course but to obey, and the Government approved of his having done so."<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Clarke to Mantell, 23 June 1865, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.12.

<sup>60</sup> Heale, Memorandum, 27 June 1865, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.14.

### 3.2 Katikati Te Puna block

By April 1865 Heale had been forced to postpone work at Tauranga because the land had still not been made subject to the New Zealand Settlements Act and the increasing opposition to the survey from Ngati Ranginui. He questioned whether the government should proceed with the military settlement of the district as planned. As an alternative he suggested that the Native Land Court could investigate title with the 1st Waikato Regiment relocating to another district where confiscated land was more readily available. In the end, however, Heale concluded that the original proposal was still the most appropriate in the circumstances, particularly since there would be no breach of any agreements with the military settlers and the economic development of Tauranga would not be left to chance. According to Heale, there were "great objects to be gained from opening up this very available country, and most important political and commercial centre."<sup>61</sup>

The survey of the Katikati Te Puna block was equally problematic for the government. In January 1865 Francis Dart Fenton, Chief Judge of the Native Land Court, had made an advance to a surveyor to begin work on the disputed block. Local officials had not been consulted about this survey which was at variance with other arrangements endorsed by Ngati Tamatera and Ngaiterangi. Aware of the vociferous opposition to the cession from Pirirakau, the Civil Commissioner for Hauraki, James Mackay, declined to assist with the survey proposed by Fenton: "it turned out that my refusal was most judicious, as the rebellious portion of the Ngaiterangi sent a messenger to Te Moananui and Ngatitamatera, that if they came to Katikati, to survey the land they would oppose them, and if they wished to draw the chain it should be over their necks."<sup>62</sup>

The surveyor who received the advance, Drummond Hay, appears to have done little work after learning of the difficulties associated with the Katikati Te Puna block. Later in the year a clearly impatient Fenton requested the immediate completion of the survey or return the advance.<sup>63</sup> In response Mackay asked that Hay be instructed not to proceed with any work until receiving instructions from the Office of the Civil Commissioner in Auckland.<sup>64</sup> Fenton reluctantly acceded to this request but criticised Mackay for obstructing a speedy resolution of the disputes among the competing claimants. According to the Chief Judge, "Mr Mackay, in his capacity of Civil Commissioner, can continue to frustrate any attempts to get the matter

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p.15.

<sup>62</sup> Mackay to Fitzgerald, 16 September 1865, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.16.

<sup>63</sup> Dickey to Hay, 13 September 1865, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.17.

<sup>64</sup> Mackay to Dickey, 16 September 1865, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.17.

settled; and I submit that, under the circumstances, I should be relieved from my pecuniary liability as an accountant to the Crown for the £75.”<sup>65</sup>

### 3.3 Meetings at Motuhoa

In October 1865 the Stafford ministry took over from the administration headed by Weld. The new government initiated some sort of investigation into the difficulties at Tauranga, and some four months later the Defence Minister, Theodore Haultain, arrived at Te Papa. He told a gathering of chiefs at Motuhoa that “we have come to settle this question of land now so long pending. There were certain terms made at the time of the surrender, on peace being concluded; we are about to carry out those propositions.”<sup>66</sup> Haultain reiterated that the government would retain 50,000 acres together with the Katikati Te Puna block. Some of those who attended the meeting expressed disquiet at the intentions of the government. For instance, Penetaka of Ngati Rangi told Haultain that “when you have taken these lands you will keep returning and taking more and more.”<sup>67</sup>

In late March 1866 Grey returned to Tauranga in an attempt to secure agreement on the boundaries of the confiscated territory. He was accompanied by Whitaker who was able to pursue an undoubted interest in all matters relating to confiscation through his election as the Superintendent of the Province of Auckland. On 26 March a meeting was held at Motuhoa where the Governor apparently confirmed that the government would retain a quarter of the district.<sup>68</sup> According to Clarke, “the Natives in their discussion of the matter showed a very different spirit to that manifested in 1864, and it was not until His Excellency told the Natives that he would resort to extreme measures if they would not comply that they succumbed and agreed to give up 50,000 acres.”<sup>69</sup>

In respect of the eastern boundary, some members of Ngaiterangi suggested the Waimapu river while Whitaker argued in favour of a line running inland from Maungatapu. Clarke was given the responsibility of determining the final location of the eastern boundary after the matter was not resolved at the meeting. As stated in a letter signed by various chiefs from Maungatapu, “Mr Clarke will settle definitely the boundary at Waimapu or Mr Whitaker’s boundary, or between those places. When it has been decided by Mr Clarke,

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<sup>65</sup> Fenton, Memorandum, 26 September 1865, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.18.

<sup>66</sup> Proceedings of a Meeting held with the Tauranga Natives, 26 February 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.19.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Riseborough, *op. cit.*, p.48.

<sup>69</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 10 May 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.62.

that is to be the permanent boundary of the land to be taken by the government for the sin of Ngaiterangi."<sup>70</sup> After inspecting the area, Clarke decided that "the boundary line shall be the Waimapu up to a place called Ngatotopeke; from thence a straight line up to the highest peak of One Tree Hill, continuing said straight line down the south side of hill till it strikes the Waimapu Stream, following up the stream into the forest."<sup>71</sup> The area retained by the government, then, contained approximately 1000 acres to the east of the Waimapu river.<sup>72</sup>

The government had initially suggested that the western boundary would be the Wairoa river. For example, Clarke recalled that "the block of land to be confiscated was to be that portion of Tauranga between the rivers Waimapu, on the south, and Te Wairoa, on the north; all their land to the north of Te Puna the Natives were to be paid for at the rate of three shillings per acre."<sup>73</sup> However, the use of the Wairoa river to define the confiscated territory was subject to change according to the priorities of the government. At Motuhoa Grey and Whitaker explained that the western boundary would be extended if 50,000 acres could not be found between the Waimapu and Wairoa rivers. According to William Mair, the Resident Magistrate at Opotiki who acted as the interpreter in March 1866, "the Natives were distinctly informed that no point could be named as the probable limit on that side, but that it might extend as far as Te Puna."<sup>74</sup> Some of those present objected to this proposal, but after being threatened by Grey with military action if compliance was not forthcoming, the proposals were accepted. At the request of Whitaker, a memorandum containing these conditions was prepared and signed by the parties.<sup>75</sup>

### 3.4 Resumption of survey

In May 1865 the provisions of the New Zealand Settlements Act were extended to Tauranga. The survey of the district, however, did not resume until the appointment of Frederic Utting as District Surveyor some 12 months later. Utting was an engineer from England whose first task was to ascertain the quantity of land between the Waimapu and Wairoa rivers. Archibald Turner, another engineer but trained in Canada, was duly engaged to cut the western boundary. He had been an officer in the Colonial Mounted Defence Force and fought at Te Ranga before being transferred to the 1st Waikato Regiment.

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<sup>70</sup> Memorandum, 26 March 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.63.

<sup>71</sup> Clarke to Whitaker, 1 May 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.63.

<sup>72</sup> Riseborough, *op. cit.*, p.49.

<sup>73</sup> Clarke to Mantell, 23 June 1865, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.12.

<sup>74</sup> Mair to Rolleston, 20 March 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.53.

<sup>75</sup> Memorandum, 26 March 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.63.

Clarke stipulated that Ranapia of Hairini should accompany Turner "first, to prevent annoyance to the survey party; and, secondly, as the principal land owner in the district, to thoroughly commit him to the present arrangement."<sup>76</sup> Within the space of a few months Utting was able to report that Turner had been joined by a number of other surveyors who were all working between the Waimapu and Wairoa rivers. As a consequence, Utting confidently estimated that a sufficient quantity of land would be available for the 1st Waikato Regiment towards the end of the year.<sup>77</sup>

However, the potential unsuitability of the confiscated block for military settlement soon became apparent after the surveyors had been at work for several months. In May 1866 Utting noted that "nothing like an adequate quantity of 'good agricultural land' can be obtained within the limits of the confiscated block, as the greater part of it is of so rugged and broken a character, that scarcely any practicable road at all can be laid out upon it, and that roads laid out as required by the specification would be impassable."<sup>78</sup> This particular difficulty could be easily resolved by retaining an appropriate amount of land beyond the Wairoa river as intimated by Grey and Whitaker at Motuhoā.

Utting noted that the surveyors had been instructed "to forward the outlines of their respective blocks as early as possible so that the total area of the land under surveys may be ascertained and the deficiency made up on the West side of the River Wairoa."<sup>79</sup> Clarke concurred with the extension of the survey. He told James Richmond, the Native Minister, that "the district surveyor reported to me that 50,000 acres was not to be obtained between these two rivers, consequently it became necessary to extend the surveys to the north bank of the Wairoa. This I took great pains to explain the Natives."<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Clarke to Whitaker, 1 May 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.63.

<sup>77</sup> Harold J Jenks, *Forgotten Men. The Survey of Tauranga and District 1864-1869*, Tauranga Historical Society, Tauranga, p.29.

<sup>78</sup> Utting to Heale, 29 May 1866, cited in Stokes, *op.cit.*, p.102.

<sup>79</sup> Utting to Heale, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

<sup>80</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 20 September 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.20.



## 4. Civil Disobedience

### 4.1 Peaceful protest

The geography of the area was not the only cause for concern amongst local officials. In June 1866 some of the surveyors were forced to stop work after being threatened by local Maori. The most serious incident occurred along the Waimapu river near Oropi with the survey party of Edward Beere being forced to return to Te Papa.<sup>81</sup> These events were reported to Clarke who recommended that the work should continue as there was no reason for any alarm. Utting was subsequently able to report that the surveyors "received no further molestation from the Natives. Mr Clarke's letter has apparently produced the best effect on them."<sup>82</sup>

After finishing work on the Otumoetai block, Richard Jordan and Francis Hewson were assigned the survey to the west of the Wairoa river in July. Jordan established a base near Ruahihi while Hewson camped at the inlet of the Wairoa river. The survey parties immediately started to cut the western boundary of the confiscated territory and work continued without interruption for a short period. By August the continued presence of the surveyors prompted Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi to consult with Wiremu Tamehana who had recently returned from a visit to Wellington. They told him that the surveyors had crossed the Wairoa river. "Stop your work," Wiremu Tamehana told Clarke, "let it cease at Te Wairoa and at Waimapu on the other side; do not persist determining."<sup>83</sup> The Ngati Haua chief added that he would attempt to resolve the dispute.

This letter of protest was ignored by Clarke and the surveyors continued with their work to the west of the Wairoa river. In early September Wiremu Tamehana responded by writing directly to Jordan and Hewson. "Stop your surveying," he told them, "the place of blood is on the other side of Te Wairoa; the place of money is at Katikati. As it is return to the other side of Te Wairoa."<sup>84</sup> Once again, the advice of Wiremu Tamehana was not taken seriously, and despite subsequently being told to stop the survey by Pirirakau, who also removed some pegs for good measure, Jordan and Hewson continued with their work.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Harold J Jenks, *Forgotten Men. The Survey of Tauranga and District 1864-1869*, Tauranga Historical Society, Tauranga, p.30.

<sup>82</sup> Utting, Memorandum, 4 July 1866, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

<sup>83</sup> Tamehana to Clarke, 23 August 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.21.

<sup>84</sup> Tamehana to Jordan and Hewson, 2 September 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.22.

<sup>85</sup> Hewson to Clarke, 19 September 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.22.

## 4.2 Direct action

Pirirakau soon decided that more direct action was required to convince the surveyors to stay on the other side of the Wairoa river. For several days a runanga at Whakamarama discussed the matter, and after consulting with Wiremu Tamehana, the decision was made to seize some of the tools belonging the surveyors. According to Clarke, Pirirakau were determined "to stop the surveys on the north bank of the Wairoa, on the ground that the land belonged to them, that they were not parties to the Tauranga surrender, and that the Ngaiterangi had no right to cede their territory."<sup>86</sup>

On the morning of 17 September, Jordan and Hewson both returned to Te Papa, probably with the intention of purchasing supplies and reporting on progress. Shortly after the departure of Jordan, a group led by Wiremu Hunia visited the camp at Ruahihi, and while two assistants were deliberately engaged in conversation, surveying equipment was taken from several of the tents. When asked to explain the purpose of their unexpected visit, the party said that because Jordan had ignored previous warnings from Wiremu Tamehana, "they had taken the articles with the intention of stopping the work, and that if I persisted in the work they would resist."<sup>87</sup> The group then loaded the gear into a canoe and paddled down stream to the mouth of the Wairoa river where more tools were taken from the site occupied by Hewson. After being informed of the incident, Hewson immediately returned to his camp, and accompanied by an assistant, travelled inland to Whakamarama to reclaim his property. He reported to Clarke that "they refused to give them up, saying they had acted according to William Thompson's orders, and the matters now rested between him and the Governor."<sup>88</sup>

Jordan and Hewson stopped work pending advice from Clarke on the recovery of the surveying equipment and the safety of their camps on the banks of the Wairoa river. The response of Clarke suggested that the extension of the survey was not only designed to secure the necessary amount of land but also to punish Pirirakau for their support of the Kingitanga. "Independently of the arrangement made by His Excellency," Clarke told Richmond, "it would have been a manifest injustice to the other Tauranga Natives that the Pirirakau - the most implicated in the rebellion, many of whom have never surrendered, and who are now the most troublesome in the district - should be allowed to escape without the

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<sup>86</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 25 September 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.23.

<sup>87</sup> Jordan to Clarke, 18 September 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.21.

<sup>88</sup> Hewson to Clarke, 19 September 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.22.

forfeiture of a single acre of land, while their less guilty neighbours have in some instances lost nearly all the land they possessed."<sup>89</sup>

The surveyors provided a written statement of the alleged theft, but arrest warrants were not issued by Clarke, "knowing well that an attempt at capture would inevitably cause a serious disturbance, and perhaps loss of life."<sup>90</sup> Apart from Wiremu Hunia, the others in the raiding party were said to have been Rawiri Tata, Herewini, Rota and Te Kepa Ringatu.

Whilst awaiting instructions from the government on the apprehension of the alleged offenders, Clarke despatched a Maori to gather some information about Pirirakau. Although the agent did not receive a particularly cordial reception, a meeting did take place where Pirirakau reiterated their position in respect of the surveys. Rawiri Tata said that "he was acting under the advice of William Thompson Te Waharoa; that he had sent a letter to that chief with the measuring tape, and that he would not give up the articles and instruments taken out of the surveyors' tents, until he had heard from William Thompson."<sup>91</sup>

The government approved of the decision not to issue the arrest warrants and supported any move which would contribute to the maintenance of peace in the district. Clarke was informed that "with this view the surveys must for the present be stopped."<sup>92</sup> The Governor wrote to Wiremu Tamehana encouraging him to use his undoubted influence over Pirirakau to secure the safe return of the surveying equipment. In reply, the Ngati Haua chief confirmed his opposition to the survey of land to the west of the Wairoa river and requested Grey to "cause the survey to be discontinued, lest we all again become confused, because we are all now sitting in peace; but should the survey be continued we shall again become confused."<sup>93</sup>

### 4.3 Aukati

The impounding of surveying equipment was only part of an overall strategy adopted by Ngati Ranginui to prevent the extension of Pakeha settlement into their territory. Another method was the establishment of aukati, or lines not to be crossed, in various parts of the district. In January 1865 Greer reported that "most of the Ngaiterangi people have returned to their settlements; they have only partially given up Pai Marire; those who remain out state that they will not interfere with those who come in , but that they

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<sup>89</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 20 September 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.21.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 25 September 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.23.

<sup>92</sup> Rolleston to Clarke, 2 October 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20 p. 23.

<sup>93</sup> Wiremu Tamehana to Grey, 11 October 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, p.23.

will draw a line from the Wairoa, across Te Ranga, and from thence towards Maketu, and that neither Queen's Natives nor Pakehas must cross it." He recognised that the aukati was a challenge to the authority of the government: "of course that would be to undo all that has been done and take back the land."<sup>94</sup>

Another aukati along the Wairoa river prevented both Pakeha and Maori from using the Wairere track to make the journey from Tauranga to Waikato. Pirirakau told Heale that he would not be allowed to pass through Whakamarama on his way to Matamata, and that if this warning was ignored, his horses and possessions would be confiscated, as happened to the unfortunate Captain Wilson on a previous occasion.<sup>95</sup> Similarly, a group of Te Arawa on their way to a Native Land Court hearing in Cambridge were twice prevented from taking the shorter route over the Kaimai ranges.<sup>96</sup> Even prior to the establishment of the aukati some travellers had received a hostile reception from local Maori. In early 1866 William Mair travelled along "the inland route passing through Whakamarama and Waiwhatawhata, regular Hauhau villages in some of which they were not too civil."<sup>97</sup>

Clarke argued that "the 'Kati' spoken of has not been established specially to prevent the Arawa from being present at the Land Court, but is part of a general policy established by the disaffected Natives to prevent information being brought out of their district."<sup>98</sup> Rather than being an attempt to inhibit the flow of intelligence, the establishment of the aukati was a clear assertion that land to the west of the Wairoa river remained under the mana of Pirirakau. From the perspective of Pirirakau the government had no authority to send surveyors into the territory of the Kingitanga without the consent of Wiremu Tamehana. Even Clarke was forced to concede that the political significance of the aukati established by Pirirakau: "these Natives, fully relying of the countenance and support of William Thompson, have assumed a very defiant attitude prejudicial to the peace and quiet of the district, and unless they are once checked the disaffection will spread and cause much future trouble."<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Greer to Deputy Quartermaster General, 29 January 1865, *AJHR*, 1865, A-5, p.4.

<sup>95</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 3 October 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.23; W Mair, *Journal*, 3 October 1866, MS 1466-1468, ATL.

<sup>96</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 25 October 1866, *AJHR*, A-20, 1867, p.24.

<sup>97</sup> W Mair, *Journal*, 13 March 1866, MS 1466-1468, ATL.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 3 October 1866, *AJHR*, A-20, 1867, p.23.

#### 4.4 Assistance from Taranaki and Ngati Porou

The influence of the Kingitanga and Pai Marire was evident when armed parties of Taranaki and Ngati Porou arrived in Tauranga to support the campaign against the surveys. The five individuals from Taranaki were led by Kewene, and although firm adherents of the new faith, the fact that men from Ngati Ranginui had formed part of the Kingitanga force during the battle of Mahoetahi in Taranaki had clearly not been forgotten. Commanded by Ropata, the small group of Ngati Porou hailed from Mataora on the Coromandel peninsular and were also strong supporters of Pai Marire.

Clarke reported that the visitors from Taranaki "had been sent to murder any surveyors they could find at work on any confiscated land." Moreover, Hori Tupaea and Whanau a Tauwhao were said to have "received a letter from the Ngati Porou who reside on the coast a little north to the district, requesting them to collect in one body and move out of the way as 'it was near'."<sup>100</sup> Clarke believed that these events demonstrated that some sort of dangerous movement inspired by Pai Marire was being contemplated in the hills behind Tauranga. While such an assessment may not have been particularly accurate, the arrival of these groups did herald a much more militant style of protest in Tauranga. Indeed, the presence of Taranaki and Ngati Porou in the district had the desired effect of discouraging Jordan and Hewson from returning to work during October. As Clarke pointed out to the Native Minister, "Harawira, a young chief of some note, came to me last week and warned me not to allow any surveyor to go to the north side of Te Wairoa, as they would certainly be murdered."<sup>101</sup>

#### 4.5 Interference with survey lines

In late September 1866 Horatio Warner replaced Utting as the District Surveyor. Warner was trained as surveyor in England and worked in Auckland before arriving in Tauranga with the military in early 1864. Soon after being appointed to the position, Warner decided to inspect the work done by Jordan and Hewson to the west of the Wairoa river.

Warner asked Clarke whether he would "meet with any molestation, and if necessary perhaps you will be good enough to furnish me with a letter to the Natives explanatory of my visit."<sup>102</sup> Whatever the advice from Clarke, an inspection proceeded without incident, and although Warner was able to report that the standard of the work was adequate, he also discovered that

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<sup>100</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 25 October 1866, *AJHR*, A-20, 1867, p.24.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> Warner to Clarke, 10 October 1866, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

there had been a considerable amount of interference with the lines cut by the surveyors: "I found the work satisfactorily performed, but the poles from all the trig stations which I may add were very well constructed together with a great number of the angle pegs, have been removed by the Natives and the lockspits in some instances filled in."<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Warner to Heale, 20 October 1866, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

## 5. Prelude to Confrontation

### 5.1 Promise of an official inquiry

Towards the end of October 1866, the continued opposition of local Maori appeared to have been successful in securing some sort of relief. The Governor announced that an investigation into the extension of the survey would be undertaken in order to establish whether the hapu of Ngati Ranginui had a legitimate grievance. Grey told Wiremu Tamehana that he had ordered "an inquiry to be made into this matter, that it may appear whether wrong has been done or not; but in the meantime my direction is that Pirirakau must give up the surveyors' instruments which they have taken."<sup>104</sup> He added that some form of redress could be expected if there was evidence to show that Jordan and Hewson had been guilty of misconduct.

The Stafford ministry moved quickly to forestall the possibility that any of the existing arrangements would be subject to modification. William Rolleston, the Under Secretary in the Native Department, told Wiremu Tamehana that "the Government have seen your letter to the Governor of the 11th October, on the subject of the survey at Te Puna, and they wish you to be assured that they will not put any new condition upon the word of the Governor which he spoke to the Ngaiterangi in 1864."<sup>105</sup> By stating that the terms of the surrender would be strictly observed, the government was not assuring local Maori that additional territory would not be confiscated, but rather indicating there would not be any reduction in the amount of land retained for the military settlement.

The government also hoped that the promise of an inquiry would prevent any escalation of the dispute, with the hapu of Ngati Ranginui told to wait peacefully until the Governor visited Tauranga to find a solution and rectify any mistakes. Rolleston urged that "no hasty conclusion be come to on the part of the Maoris. They should understand that to survey the land does not mean with the Europeans to seize it. Let this be quite clear."<sup>106</sup> Meanwhile, Grey had qualified his promise to Wiremu Tamehana by stipulating that the survey would continue during the course of the inquiry. A letter to this effect was forwarded to Mackay who was to make the necessary arrangements for the delivery of this most important despatch to the Ngati Haua chief.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Governor to Wiremu Tamehana, 22 October 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p. 24.

<sup>105</sup> Rolleston to William Thompson, 30 October 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p. 26.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> Halse to Mackay, 5 December 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.35.

## 5.2 Further meetings at Motuhoa

In late October Mackay was instructed to take a more active role in resolving the problems associated with the survey of the confiscated territory. The Governor had not yet visited Tauranga to resolve the issue, and as was soon to become apparent to Ngati Ranginui, any thorough investigation of the dispute was unlikely to take place under Mackay. Rather than arranging delivery to Wiremu Tamehana, the letter from Grey was returned to the Native Department in Wellington because he did not believe that there was any foundation to the complaints. Although Mackay was admonished for his shortcomings as a postal agent, the government anticipated the results of any inquiry by accepting his assessment of the situation. The Native Minister had "no reason to doubt the correctness of your statement with regard to Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi's grievance, it must be observed, however, that he speaks not only on his own account, but apparently on behalf of the Pirirakau." <sup>108</sup>

A meeting was arranged at Motuhoa to discuss the extension of the confiscation boundary and a particular effort was made to encourage the alleged malcontents to attend. "Hearken, I arrived at this place," Mackay told Pirirakau, "the reason (for my coming) is to carefully arrange matters about this district, so that the disputes may be favourably concluded. Now, on Wednesday, the 31st day of October, 1866, the tribes will assemble at Motuhoa. If you like to come to that meeting it is good."<sup>109</sup> On the appointed day, Mackay and Clarke, together with various chiefs of Ngaiterangi, waited for Pirirakau to arrive at Motuhoa, but when it became apparent that they would not be attending the meeting, the discussion was scheduled to start the following morning.

Local officials were asked whether the land required for the military settlement could not be found between the Waimapu and Wairoa rivers. Clarke told the meeting that "the surveyors had reported there were not 50,000 acres between the two rivers, consequently land had been surveyed between the Wairoa and the Puna."<sup>110</sup> However, the surveyors had cut a total of 55,000 acres which comprised 40,800 acres between the Waimapu and Wairoa rivers and 14,200 between the Wairoa and Te Puna rivers. As a result, Mackay proposed to return "five thousand acres by cutting a line from the Ruangarara branch of the Wairoa to the Puna river, excluding the Pirirakau cultivations near Waiwhatawhata and Te Irihanga."<sup>111</sup> He added that "as it appeared that some loyal Natives had lost a good deal of land within the

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<sup>108</sup> Halse to Mackay, 5 December 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.36.

<sup>109</sup> Mackay to Rawiri Tata and others, 27 October 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.31.

<sup>110</sup> 'Report of Mr Mackay on the Katikati purchase and other questions relating to the district of Tauranga', 26 June 1867, LE 1/1867/114, NA.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*



confiscated block; and some ex-rebels had little land elsewhere, I offered to make certain reserves which with those previously sanctioned by Mr Whitaker made a total of upwards of six thousand acres within this block, reducing the actual quantity retained by the Government to about forty-four thousand acres."<sup>112</sup> Pirirakau were to be granted a reserve of 400 acres.

After some discussion, the meeting accepted the proposals relating to the return of the excess and the allocation of reserves. As Clarke reported, "at a large meeting of the Tauranga Natives, held at Motuhua, at which Mr. Commissioner Mackay and myself were present, the extension of the confiscated land on the west of the Wairoa was fully discussed, and an amicable and satisfactory arrangement was come to."<sup>113</sup> Although Mackay was worried about the absence of Pirirakau, the assembled chiefs of Ngaiterangi suggested that his concern was misplaced. "I then expressed my regret that the Pirirakau were not present", wrote Mackay, "and the general expression was, 'Who are they? What have those slaves to do with it? The only man of any rank is Maungapohatu, he is connected with us. Take the land. Do not ask them about it.' "<sup>114</sup>

Nonetheless, another attempt was made to persuade Pirirakau to attend a meeting at Motuhua. Mackay sent a messenger to Whakamarama to explain that Ngaiterangi had not only agreed to the extension of the confiscation boundary but were also about to conclude the Te Puna Katikati purchase.<sup>115</sup> The response from Pirirakau once again demonstrated their determined opposition to government policy: "we will not agree to (or consent to give) the land from Te Wairoa extending to Waipapa. We will not consent to the money; these words are true: No, for the money. No for the rebellion. Desist from your disputing (do not contend the point) stop where you are."<sup>116</sup>

### 5.3 Mackay visits Waiwhatawhata

In reply, the persistent Mackay said that he would travel to Waiwhatawhata to negotiate a settlement and secure a lasting peace in the district. He told Pirirakau, "do not be vexed because we wish to go (to your place), but you had better all assemble at Te Waiwhatawhata to-morrow. What harm is there in speaking in daylight (peaceably); speaking to each other face to face? There is no anger for a word which is spoken out; in the hidden word is wrong."<sup>117</sup> Pirirakau replied by saying that an official visit from Mackay

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 12 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.25.

<sup>114</sup> 'Report of Mr Mackay on the Katikati purchase', *op.cit.*

<sup>115</sup> Mackay to Rawiri Tata and others, 2 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.31.

<sup>116</sup> Rawiri Tata and others to Mackay, 2 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.31.

<sup>117</sup> Mackay to Rawiri Tata and others, 5 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.31.

would make no difference: "remain away it will be the same thing; if we go to you it will be the same thing. We are not the sellers or conveyors (of the land) to you. Mr Mackay - you are tired perhaps of the number of writings (letters you have written). The matter rests with you. If you come it is with you (you can please yourself whether you come or stop away)."<sup>118</sup>

On 6 November, Mackay, accompanied by a Native Assessor and two Native Policemen, travelled to Waiwhatawhata to meet with Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi. In approving tones *The Daily Southern Cross* reported that he "bearded them in their den."<sup>119</sup> Mackay endeavoured "to persuade them to arrange matters quietly, and unite themselves with the Ngaiterangi tribe, and explained the arrangement which had been agreed to about the land."<sup>120</sup>

Rather predictably, Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi refused to acknowledge either the confiscation or cession of land to the west of the Wairoa river and warned that they would continue to disrupt the surveys. Rawiri Tata said that "William Thompson has given orders to stop the surveyors, and the whole affair is in the hands of Thompson and the Governor."<sup>121</sup> Disclaiming any knowledge of the inquiry promised by Grey, Mackay said that Wiremu Tamehana had no right to interfere in matters relating to Tauranga, a comment which was clearly meant to antagonise those present. Indeed, Ratima made a speech "full of paimarireism, and fierce invectives against the Government", while Penetaka said "he would not give up any land and would obstruct the survey. He would fight against the Ngaiterangi; he considered them worse than the Government."<sup>122</sup>

Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi were told that the surveyors would now be protected by an armed guard. Mackay said "they would not be molested so long as they remained quiet in their own settlements, but any armed party coming to the surveyors would be fired upon." Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi were also advised to renounce any claim to land west of the Wairoa river and to request a share of the purchase price for the Te Puna Katikati block. Mackay reported that "all these remarks were treated with the utmost contempt; one man, Parata, when I went into a whare, told me, in a sneering manner, that he supposed I would come sneaking behind the soldiers out of danger. If I would only come ahead of the survey party they would capture me and chop me to pieces (poroporo rawa)."<sup>123</sup>

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118 Rawiri Tata and others to Mackay, 5 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.32.

119 *The Daily Southern Cross*, 12 November 1866.

120 'Report of Mr Mackay on the Katikati purchase', *op.cit.*, p.32.

121 Mackay to Richmond, 22 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.28.

122 *Ibid.*

123 *Ibid.*

#### 5.4 Ngaiterangi travel to Irihanga

Mackay and his companions had an overnight stay at Motuhoa before returning to Te Papa. After being informed of the outcome of the meeting at Waiwhatawhata, a group of Ngaiterangi chiefs asked to be given the opportunity to meet with Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi before the resumption of surveys to the west of the Wairoa river. Mackay agreed to the request in the hope that "some good results would accrue from their visit."<sup>124</sup> A meeting was held at Te Irihanga but failed to produce the outcome desired by Mackay. "The Ngaiterangi chiefs came back around 4pm," he wrote, "and reported that the Pirirakau had agreed not to interfere with the survey themselves, but said another tribe would probably do so." From the perspective of the government, "this was anything but satisfactory."<sup>125</sup>

Almost immediately arrangements were made for the protection of survey parties. Mackay explained to Colonel Hamilton, the commanding officer of the 12th (East Suffolk) Regiment of Foot stationed at Te Papa, that all the chiefs of Ngaiterangi had consented to cede land between the Wairoa river and the Te Puna stream extending inland to the Te Ruangarara stream, a block which was estimated to contain 9000 acres. However, Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi had recently expressed "their determination to oppose and obstruct the survey. One of the chiefs, Te Kepa Ringatu, stated that 'blood will be shed.'" Mackay told Hamilton that under these circumstances he had no alternative but to request force of 200 men to protect the surveyors engaged to cut the boundary line.<sup>126</sup>

Mackay also wrote to Rawiri Tata and his kinsmen about their meeting with Ngaiterangi at Irihanga and the impending resumption of the survey to the west of the Wairoa river. Although claiming not to understand the meaning of the statement that the survey would be disrupted by some other tribe, Mackay in fact thought that such comments were an attempt to deceive the surveyors into beginning work without the protection of a military force. Nonetheless, he still managed to believe that Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi had agreed to the survey: "my thoughts are very clear as regards your side - that is your consenting for the surveyor to go to lay down the boundary of the Governor's land. It is good! It is right!" Mackay added that "the soldiers will proceed to-morrow to Waiari, and they will remain there until the survey work is completed. You remain quiet at your own settlement and the hand of no man shall touch you, if you remain quiet you will not be interfered with in

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<sup>124</sup> 'Report of Mr Mackay on the Katikati purchase', op.cit., p.35.

<sup>125</sup> Mackay to Richmond, 22 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.29.

<sup>126</sup> Mackay to Hamilton, 7 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.32.

any way."<sup>127</sup> In reply, Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi said that "it is right, the words of Ngaiterangi. These are our exact words, 'our hands shall not touch your chain (or survey).' But here is the taker of it or the something else. As to the proceedings of your soldiers that rests with you. Friend, to our idea your thoughts are hasty. (We think you are too hasty.)"<sup>128</sup>

### 5.5 Imperial troops cross the Wairoa river

On 9 November a survey party led by Turner and Mackay crossed the Wairoa river to cut the line between the Te Ruangarara and Te Puna streams. The accompanying military force comprised 200 men of the 12th Regiment under the command of Captain Makron together with 120 troops of the 1st Waikato Regiment stationed at Waiari. Although some local Maori kept a watchful eye on the surveyors, there were no incidents, and after three days the expedition returned to Te Papa. An unintended consequence of the operation was the exclusion of the Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi settlements at Waiwhatawhata, Whakamarama and Te Irihanga from the area to be confiscated. Mackay found that "to have taken the line straight and include the proper quantity of 9,000 acres, we would have had to cut through the cultivations adjacent to Waiwhatawhata. I therefore made three angles in the line, which excluded 800 or 900 acres."<sup>129</sup>

The decision to deploy imperial troops marked an escalation in the dispute and demonstrated that the government would not hesitate in using force of arms to implement confiscation. No doubt alarmed by this turn of events, Rawiri Tata travelled to Waikato to consult with Wiremu Tamehana, returning to Tauranga shortly before the survey party had finished work. He was accompanied by an emissary from Ngati Haua, Te Raihi, who was to meet with local officials to discuss the conflict over the survey of land at Te Puna. Rawiri Tata informed Mackay that "I have returned, my companion is Te Raihi; to-morrow he will proceed to explain the words of William Thompson Te Waharoa."<sup>130</sup>

Mackay told Rawiri Tata that "it is right. Both of you come. If you come carry a white flag lest we do not clearly understand who you are."<sup>131</sup> It would appear, however, that the proposed discussion did not take place, probably because the Pirirakau chief was unwilling to have a meeting at Waiari

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<sup>127</sup> Mackay to Rawiri Tata and others, 8 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, pp.32-33.

<sup>128</sup> Pirirakau, Ngati Rangi, Te Mate Haere to Mackay, 9 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.33.

<sup>129</sup> Mackay to Richmond, 22 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.30.

<sup>130</sup> Rawiri Tata to Mackay, 11 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.33.

<sup>131</sup> Mackay to Rawiri Tata, 12 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.33.

surrounded by the 12th Regiment. In any event, Mackay believed that the meeting was a pretext to delay the survey until a sufficient number of reinforcements had joined Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi.

## 5.6 Redoubt built at Omanawa

Although the western boundary of the confiscated territory had now been surveyed, the contingent from Ngati Porou remained a concern for local officials. There were reports that this group now planned to attack surveyors working between the Wairoa and Waimapu rivers after the presence of the 12th Regiment prevented any sort of interference with the work of Turner and Mackay. After due consideration, Clarke ordered some survey parties to return to Te Papa, with the surveyors at Omanawa and Oropi considered to be in particular danger after the Ngati Porou warriors had recently passed through the area.<sup>132</sup>

On 18 November the Defence Minister stopped at Tauranga while travelling from Napier to Auckland. In an effort to prevent any further delays in the completion of the surveys, Haultain ordered the 1st Waikato Regiment to establish a post on the Wairoa river. Shortly afterwards, a force of 100 men under the command of Captain William Mair built and garrisoned a redoubt at Omanawa. Mackay hoped that "the action which has been taken in this matter will prevent any further trouble, and that the surveyors will be able to complete their work in peace and security."<sup>133</sup> Indeed, Haultain predicted that the surveys would be complete within two weeks.<sup>134</sup>

The relative quiet convinced Clarke that the surveyors could safely resume work at Waimapu. Nonetheless, local officials continued to gather intelligence about the potential allies of Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi. There were rumours that a large force led by the Pai Marire prophet and Waitaha chief Hakaraia was in the district. Mackay received a report "that 100 men of Hakaraia's people passed through [Oropi] on Tuesday last (20th), on their way to the Pirirakau settlement at Waiwhatawhata." Mackay hoped "to obtain some further particulars, but failed in procuring any reliable information about it. Maihi Pohepohe was said to be the leader of the party."<sup>135</sup>

Clarke was also told that "Hakaraia, of [Kenana], had, after much persuasion, given his consent that hostilities should commence in this district, that he,

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<sup>132</sup> Mackay to Richmond, 22 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.30; Warner to Clarke, 11 November 1866, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

<sup>133</sup> Mackay to Richmond, 22 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.30.

<sup>134</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 24 November 1866, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>135</sup> Mackay to Richmond, 26 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.35.

with 100 followers, was on his way to join the disaffected Natives, and that fighting would commence in earnest." Upon further inquiry Clarke discovered that "the old man disavowed any intention of countenancing any hostile attack, and that if any such rumours had been set afloat, they had been done so by [Maihi] Pohepohe to serve his own ends."<sup>136</sup> Indeed, local officials had to concede that had not in fact even left Kenana.

During late November a member of Ngaiterangi was held prisoner at Waiwhatawhata. Mackay reported that "a friendly Native named Hamuera te Paki, who received permission from me to go to the Irihanga (Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi) settlement, to bring away his wife, who was on a visit there, has been made prisoner by the Hauhau Natives; five men are set over him as a guard to prevent his escape."<sup>137</sup> The treatment of the captive was the subject of persistent rumour and sensational newspaper articles. According to one report, Hamuera Te Paki was tried and sentenced to death, but after his wife became psychotic, the sentence was commuted on the condition that the prisoner would embrace Pai Marire. A correspondent observed that "such stuff as this might be copied into some respectable paper, and do an infinite amount of harm. I need hardly say that no professional novelist could have more perverted facts than the writer of the article in question has done."<sup>138</sup>

By this time Henry Skeet had replaced Warner as the District Surveyor. He soon discovered that although the surveys on the Waimapu block had proceeded without interruption, there remained some minor work to be done on the southern boundary of the confiscated territory. Skeet duly instructed Henry Graham to "proceed to 'Oropi' Block and continue the survey commenced by Messrs Gundry and Richardson." The surveyor was reminded that "should any Native difficulty arise Mr Graham will at once communicate with the District Officer."<sup>139</sup>

On 28 December Wiremu Tamehana died at Maungatautari after a long illness. From the point of view of settlers, the death of the renowned Ngati Haua chief heralded a renewed period of uncertainty in the district, with the hapu of Ngati Ranginui now no longer subject to his peaceful counsel. A local reporter commented that "there can be no doubt that Thompson's influence has been steadily exerted for a considerable time past to repress disturbance and to save lives of Europeans." He added that "we are inclined to think that it is very much owing to his efforts that the Tauranga difficulty was so far

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<sup>136</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 12 December 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.36.

<sup>137</sup> Mackay to Richmond, 26 November 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.35.

<sup>138</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 22 December 1866.

<sup>139</sup> Skeet, Memorandum, 26 December 1866, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

settled without bloodshed, the Pirirakaus having been always closely under his influence."<sup>140</sup>

### 5.7 Expulsion of surveyors

Graham established a base near the settlement of Oropi and hosted Skeet during a routine inspection. Accompanied by another Pakeha on horseback, Peter Grant, a deserter from the 1st Waikato Regiment who converted to Pai Marire, visited Oropi where he was given a letter written by local Maori. The letter explained that there were surveyors in the area, and after an absence of some two hours, Grant arrived back at Oropi with a message from Te Kaumarua, a group of Pai Marire adherents based at Taumata. He told local Maori to "send back the surveyors at once, otherwise the Te Kaumarua would come and kill them, afterwards cut them to pieces, then cook them in the Maori oven and eat them."<sup>141</sup> After being warned of the immediate danger, the surveyors reluctantly decided to leave their camp. Graham is said to have remarked that "there must be something wrong from the excited manner of the natives, one woman having violently seized Mr Skeet's arm in endeavouring to persuade him to go."<sup>142</sup>

Te Kaumarua were said to have been "a portion of the Hauhaus to the number of thirty, all armed with double guns." This group consisted of men from "different tribes, but principally of the Ngatiporou and Ngaiterangi, amongst the latter of whom were Penetaka, Wiremu Kairihi, Tupara, Hunia, and Te Poio. "<sup>143</sup> Te Kaumarua arrived at Oropi almost immediately after the departure of Graham and Skeet. According to one observer, "about half an hour after the surveyors had left I heard the report of a gun; the Hauhaus then made their appearance, twenty-four in number, advancing in single file; they had a flag flying in front of them; they were all armed."<sup>144</sup>

That evening a meeting was held to discuss the fate of the equipment left behind by Graham. Te Kaumarua declared that "they had come to seize (muru) all the effects of the surveyors." In reply, Tauaroa from Oropi said "this land, since peace was first declared, remains in the same state (undisturbed) ; let this land remain in peace. Don't touch anything belonging to the surveyors; leave them with me that I may return them in safety."<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 3 January 1867.

<sup>141</sup> Hariaia, Statement, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.39.

<sup>142</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 8 January 1867.

<sup>143</sup> Statement, Te Ranapia, 31 December 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.39.

<sup>144</sup> Hariaia, Statement, op.cit., p.39; Clarke to Agent of General Government, 4 January 1867, IA 1/67/103, NA.

<sup>145</sup> Statement, Te Ranapia, op.cit., p.39.

Despite these pleas Te Kaumarua seized most of the tools and provisions at the camp and then left Oropi.

Te Kaumarua planned to consult with Hakaraia, but before travelling to Kenana, expelled another survey party working on the Waimapu block. Skeet informed Hamilton that "a party of armed natives numbering about thirty has been traversing the southern part of the confiscated land, threatening and ordering in the surveyors from Mr Beere's survey near 'Paengaroa'."<sup>146</sup> Clarke instructed all other survey parties to return to Te Papa and decided that surveys could not resume without military protection: "I do not think it is safe for the surveyors to go on with their work, unless under the protection of a sufficient armed party."<sup>147</sup>

### 5.8 Ngati Ranginui impede settlement

According to some commentators, the restraining influence of Wiremu Tamehana was no longer present in the district, with Pai Marire now adopting more violent tactics. *The Daily Southern Cross* observed that "when the same party drove off the surveyors a few months ago, they did so in William Thompson's name, and upon that chief repudiating their act, they were fain to restore the property they had taken." When the survey party led by Turner and Mackay crossed the Wairoa river, "the same natives sent to William Thompson to inquire whether they should resist: his answer was on no account to offer any resistance; and the disaffected natives acquiesced." Soon after the death of Wiremu Tamehana "these same natives renew their lawless acts with greater audacity than before, and an avowed determination to commit murder and indulge their savage and cannibal propensities."<sup>148</sup>

The opposition of Ngati Ranginui to the arrangements reached at Motuhoa was perceived as preventing the military settlement and economic development of Tauranga. "I will venture to say that," wrote a local reporter, "had it not been for these twenty-five or thirty lawless vagabonds, the men of the 1st Waikato would have all been located six months since; the country been saved some thousands of pounds; the provincial revenue doubled in the district." The protection of the survey parties could be resolved by the engagement of "our allies, the Arawas, who are only too anxious to extirpate the marauding band, and who would, at a moment's notice, provide 200 or 300 men for the purpose?" The advantages of kupapa troops were said to be that "the enormous Commissariat expenditure consequent on sending out

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<sup>146</sup> Skeet to Hamilton, 2 January 1867, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

<sup>147</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 8 January 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.37.

<sup>148</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 8 January 1867.



regular troops is saved, besides the fact of meeting the rebels even-handed, native to native."<sup>149</sup>

### 5.9 Death of Private Campbell

Despite the obvious dangers, some men of the 1st Waikato Regiment attempted to occupy the farm sections that they had been allocated within the confiscated territory. In early January 1867 Albert Campbell attended a parade and collected some rations at Gate Pa before heading towards his small holding at Oropi. Before reaching his destination, however, he appears to have encountered Te Kaumarua. Campbell was attacked, and according to one report, Kewene delivered the fatal blow with his tomahawk. The body was subsequently buried at the side of the road between Waimapu and Oropi. A subsequent court hearing held that "the remains of the subject of this inquest are the remains of Alfred J. Campbell, military settler, of the Tauranga district; and further, the jurors find the said Alfred J. Campbell was wilfully murdered on or about the 7th January, 1867, by some persons or persons of the aboriginal race of New Zealand, to the jurors at present unknown."<sup>150</sup>

Campbell was probably not aware that his farm section was within an aukati recently established by Hakaraia, and like the area to the west of the Wairoa river, certain parts of Waimapu were now under the mana of Tawhiao. A whare was constructed at Oropi to mark the boundary of the Kingitanga territory. The fate of Campbell demonstrated that surveyors and settlers who crossed the aukati would be punished in a summary manner. According to Clarke, "the house was said to be on the boundary of the aukati established by Hakaraia for the Ngatiporou; and I have no doubt the information was correct. The body was found about a mile and a half on the native side of the aukati."<sup>151</sup> Although his body was not discovered until much later, Campbell was in fact the first casualty of the Tauranga Bush Campaign.

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 2 September 1867.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

## 6. Outbreak of Conflict

### 6.1 Failed ambush at Oropi

Whilst in Auckland the Defence Minister was informed of the recent expulsion of the survey parties. He decided to travel to Te Papa to supervise the capture of the perpetrators : if the government continued to tolerate "these proceedings of the Hauhaus, the location of the 1st. W. Regiment will be still further delayed."<sup>152</sup> Haultain arrived in Tauranga to discover that all survey parties had stopped work and that some hapu of Ngaiterangi had retreated from their more exposed settlements. He explained to Whitaker that "the threatening appearance of affairs left me with no alternative but to remain."<sup>153</sup>

On the evening of 14 January approximately 100 men of the 1st Waikato Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Harington marched to Oropi in order to ambush the Pai Marire force. Haultain had been informed that "the Hauhaus had built a whare on land that had been allotted to a military settler some 7 or 8 miles inland, and that on the 15th. of the month they were all to assemble and take up their quarters there, when a Kati would be fixed and any European or Queen's native crossing that line was to be killed."<sup>154</sup>

The whare was deserted by the time the 1st Waikato Regiment arrived in the area, and although Harington waited for nearly 12 hours, the enemy was not so easily ambushed. In a sign of things to come, the troops destroyed the whare before returning to Te Papa. In an effort to secure more accurate intelligence about the movements of the enemy, the Defence Minister authorised the engagement of Maori mounted scouts. As Clarke pointed out, "we have no means of obtaining information, the Natives all fearing to break the 'kati' of old Hakaraia."<sup>155</sup>

After failing to ambush the Pai Marire force at Oropi, the 1st Waikato Regiment marched to the Wairoa river. Haultain had been informed that the enemy had assembled at Irihanga and Whakamarama: "I accordingly determined to proceed there and endeavour to apprehend some of them."<sup>156</sup> The bulk of the troops were stationed at the Omanawa redoubt with a small

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<sup>152</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 7 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>153</sup> Stafford to Whitaker, 16 January 1866, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>154</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>155</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 28 January 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.42.

<sup>156</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

contingent posted at Poteriwhi to protect a supply ferry, and when Harington returned to Te Papa to call out the militia, Captain Henry Goldsmith was placed in command. Ensign Horne and some other men sailed to Ruangarara stream where "hidden in the Creek was found a war canoe - this was captured, and brought alongside the Camp Omanawa Creek - without difficulty."<sup>157</sup>

## 6.2 Engagement at Irihanga

On 18 January Goldsmith received information that the property of a military settler on the bank of Wairoa river had been destroyed. After discovering that a house built by Captain Tovey had in fact been burnt down, Goldsmith decided to take the opportunity to reconnoitre.<sup>158</sup> A party of 44 men crossed the Wairoa river, and after marching in a westerly direction for several miles, approached Irihanga. According to *The Daily Southern Cross*, "some natives were seen, who waved towards the military at the same time a native was observed much nearer the advanced guard. No notice being taken of the natives, the advanced guard was fired on, and the sergeant-major of the regiment hit - the ball struck him in the chest, passing out at the back."<sup>159</sup>

The 1st Waikato Regiment immediately spread out in skirmishing order and engaged the Pai Marire force defending the settlement. Goldsmith reported that "the Maories retreated, occasionally stopping to deliver their fire. We followed, and drove them into the bush - we then retired in good order." Apart from Sergeant Major Emus, who had previously served with the 68th Regiment, there were no other casualties among the party commanded by Goldsmith. Two Maori were said to have been wounded, including Wanakore, the son of the Pirirakau chief Maungapohatu.<sup>160</sup>

Although some writers have called the action indecisive, the 1st Waikato Regiment were in fact repulsed by the opposition. Contrary to the report from Goldsmith, the Pai Marire force did not retreat but rather maintained a heavy fire for nearly an hour. Moreover, the advancing troops were deceived by the presence of apparently unarmed villagers wandering about in the distance and consequently allowed a sniper to move into position. As Clarke told Richmond, "the party, as it approached Te Irihanga, could see the Natives walking about, apparently without arms; presently one man was seen to advance; Corporal Willis, of the Militia, remarked to Sergeant-Major Emus, of the Militia, who was leading the advance guard, that he thought he saw a rifle in a Maori's hand, the Sergeant-Major replied, 'never mind, let

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<sup>157</sup> Goldsmith to Harington, 18 January 1867, AD 1/67/422, NA.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 15 January 1867.

<sup>160</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

them fire the first shot;’ hardly were the words out of his mouth when the Maori fired, and the Sergeant-Major fell, mortally wounded.”<sup>161</sup> According to a local correspondent, “this sad affair cast a gloom over Te Papa.”<sup>162</sup>

Harington returned to the Omanawa redoubt after being informed that the 1st Waikato Regiment had crossed the Wairoa river. Goldsmith was arrested for leaving his post and precipitating an engagement with the enemy. He pleaded that he had simply followed instructions to gather information about the tracks leading to the settlements of Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi, an explanation that was dismissed by his superiors.<sup>163</sup> Haultain stated that “Capt Goldsmith was not instructed by me to cross the Wairoa river; he was directed to ascend the hill near the Redoubt and observe the tracks to the landing place (at Taunoa) and also to note the features of the country on the opposite side.”<sup>164</sup> After receiving a severe reprimand, Goldsmith was released from arrest and returned to duty.

Meanwhile, there were reports that a whare at Kahakaharoa had been built on the orders of Hakaraia. Like the structure at Oropi, the whare marked the boundary of the Kingitanga territory. Accompanied by a small force of mounted volunteers, Clarke marched to Kahakaharoa only to discover that the Pai Marire force had already departed: “on arriving at the place we found a large whare recently erected, capable of containing about forty men, it bore marks of having been occupied about twenty-four hours previous to our visit; a quantity of potatoes had been stored.”<sup>165</sup> Once again, the whare was destroyed.

### 6.3 Wairoa expedition

For the next few days the 1st Waikato Regiment remained at the Omanawa redoubt as inclement weather prevented any further manoeuvres. Although there were various aspects about the engagement at Irihanga that had proved disappointing, Haultain remained confident that the Pai Marire force could be easily defeated. Indeed, the Governor had authorised the participation of the 12th Regiment in the forthcoming campaign while the redundant survey parties had formed a company of the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps. The Defence Minister decided that when the weather cleared there would be another assault on Irihanga. *The Daily Southern Cross* commented, “it soon

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<sup>161</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 28 January 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.43.

<sup>162</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 15 January 1867.

<sup>163</sup> Harington to Haultain, 19 January 1867, AD 1/67/422, NA.

<sup>164</sup> Haultain, Minute, 19 January 1867, AD 1/67/422, NA.

<sup>165</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 28 January 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.43.

became the talk of Te Papa that some move was contemplated which might prove dangerous."<sup>166</sup>

On 22 January the 1st Waikato Regiment and the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps, accompanied by an armed party of Ngaiterangi, crossed the Wairoa river in canoes and marched towards Irihanga. The government force reached the settlement shortly after dawn with the heavy mist and pouring rain providing cover. Irihanga was captured in a matter of minutes, and after pickets had been posted, the troops were ordered to destroy the settlement. However, the action could hardly be characterised as a defeat for the Pai Marire force, while the colonial troops clearly lacked discipline under fire. As Haultain observed, "only about 8 men opposed us and the advanced guard soon drove them back, and we took possession - unfortunately some of our men in the rear, when they saw firing going on in their front, began to fire also in a most insane manner, and shot one of our own people through the back (he died within half an hour) and another through his cap grazing his skull."<sup>167</sup> He confessed that he had "a partiality for well-disciplined troops." The soldier killed by the 'friendly fire' was Private Ward of the 1st Waikato Regiment.

After setting fire to some houses and destroying several acres of cultivations at Irihanga, the colonial troops stopped for some refreshments. A Pai Marire force moved to the edge of the bush surrounding the settlement and fired at the breakfast diners: "while our men where partaking of the good things that were seized from the foes, such as fowls, pigs, potatoes, &c., they received a volley from the fanatics."<sup>168</sup> There were no casualties, and after a series of skirmishes, the small party of Maori took cover in the bush. The destruction of Irihanga was to be expected as "this village was the residence of Penetaka, a native of much influence for evil among his neighbours, and one often in trouble. He was a principal at Te Ranga, and one of the party who threatened to murder any European found surveying on confiscated land; he was also the leading man in the taking of Graham's surveying instruments and stopping the survey at Oropi."<sup>169</sup>

Meanwhile, the 12th Regiment had marched from Te Papa to Minden Peak. According to Clarke, "the march was a most laborious one, and by the time the men had reached the highest peak they required a short halt to get some refreshments."<sup>170</sup> When the 1st Waikato Regiment and Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps had almost reached Waiwhatwhata, the 12th Regiment descended Minden Peak in order to encircle the Pai Marire force.

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<sup>166</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 15 January 1867.

<sup>167</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>168</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 15 January 1867.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>170</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 28 January 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.43.

Contrary to some newspaper reports of a brave attack on an entrenched enemy position, Waiwhatawhata had already been evacuated, and the colonial troops did not encounter any resistance during their advance. Harington reported that "the whares were burnt and the plantations destroyed as far as possible."<sup>171</sup> Haultain instructed Clark to post notices at Irihanga and Waiwhatawhata "acquainting the Natives with the reason for making this visit to their kaingas, viz., robbing the surveyors and firing into our men, and recommending them to give themselves up at once."<sup>172</sup>

The 12th Regiment returned to Te Papa after the capture of Waiwhatawhata. "Colonel Hamilton from this returned to Te Papa," wrote Clarke, "which was reached the same evening at half past eight o'clock, having accomplished a fatiguing march of nearly thirty miles in a most inclement day."<sup>173</sup> The colonial troops intended to return to the Omanawa redoubt by passing through Irihanga but by taking the wrong route arrived instead on the outskirts of Whakamarama. Clarke reported that "through a mistake of the Native guide the Militia took the wrong road and in a short time found themselves in another clearing; the Natives having been driven from Irihanga and Waiwhatawhata returned to this place; our men were immediately discovered, a heavy fire directly opened upon them, and although our force greatly exceeded that of the enemy they bravely contested every inch of ground."<sup>174</sup>

A fierce exchange lasted for approximately half an hour before the Pai Marire force moved back into the bush surrounding Whakamarama. Private William Stevenson was shot dead at close range, and several other men of the 1st Waikato Regiment were seriously wounded, while Maori losses were estimated to have been three warriors killed or badly injured. The colonial troops burnt all the houses but were unable to destroy many of the adjacent crops. According to Haultain, "we could only destroy a very small portion of their cultivations, which were very extensive considering the small population - there could not have been less than 1000 bushels of wheat and 200 tons of potatoes besides maize, pumpkins etc. etc. sufficient food for at least 300 people for 12 months."<sup>175</sup> Similarly, *The Daily Southern Cross* reported, "the standing corn here was very fine - about thirty acres - some of the finest seen this year; it was fired several times, but was not sufficiently ripe to burn. Everything capable of demolition was destroyed, including the houses."<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Harington to Haultain, 24 January 1867, AD 1/67/421, NA.

<sup>172</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 28 January 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.43.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>175</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>176</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 15 January 1867.

## 6.4 Return to the Omanawa redoubt

The government force returned to the Omanawa redoubt on the evening of 22 January. A local correspondent reported that the operation had been successful and that the colonial troops showed great valour: "the cool gallantry and courage of Colonel Harington was to be seen here, there, and everywhere encouraging his brave band. The cool and determined bearing was noted of Captains Fraser and Tovey; Lieutenants Horne, Hunter, Turner and Hallows; Ensigns Coates and Curtis; Captain Skeet with his troop of engineers; and last, but not least, the volunteers, militia, and men of the 1st Waikato Regiment, who have given another proof of the stuff they are made of in this brilliant affair." Unfortunately, the 12th Regiment "missed the opportunity of 'knocking a few of the fiends over'." The armed party of Ngaiterangi, which included some veterans of Gate Pa and Te Ranga, "were in the front when work was to be done, and in destroying rebel cultivations were most valuable."<sup>177</sup>

Haultain was more circumspect about the success of the expedition and the effectiveness of the 1st Waikato Regiment and the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps. He considered that "three men killed (including the Serjeant who was wounded on the previous occasion) was a severe loss on our side, considering the few Maoris that opposed us, but an attacking party in the Bush is always at a disadvantage." He thought that "the men generally behaved very well and some of them in a most gallant manner, and this was the first occasion that they had been under fire - they were out from 2 a.m. till 9 p.m."<sup>178</sup>

The operation was, in fact, something of a failure. The objective was to capture those individuals involved in the forcible expulsion of the survey parties, but even after deploying a large body of men in the field and attempting to lay waste to three settlements, the government had not apprehended any of the alleged perpetrators. Indeed, Pirirakau and Ngati Ranginui returned to Irihanga, Waiwhatawhata and Whakamarama soon after the engagement. Even Haultain was forced to admit that he had not accomplished a great deal since arriving in Tauranga. The apparent lack of success could be explained "by the impossibility of getting accurate information of the numbers and position of the Hauhaus (all the Friendly Natives dared not cross the Kati to go near them) and by my unwillingness to precipitate hostilities."<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

## 6.5 Reinforcements arrive in Tauranga

Haultain realised that he was responsible for a war effort rather than a police action soon after the colonial troops returned to the Omanawa redoubt without any prisoners. "This outbreak is assuming a more serious aspect", he observed, "and is increasing in dimensions as it progresses."<sup>180</sup> Similarly, a local reporter predicted that there would be many more operations before peace would be restored in the district: "these movements are in themselves important, and might perhaps only be the first step in a war which may end in the extermination of all opposed to the Queen's authority."<sup>181</sup>

Local officials attempted to assist the military by gathering intelligence about the movements of the Pai Marire force. Te Kuka, a Native Assessor, was instructed to visit Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi. Clarke reported that "in reply to my letters left at the Irihanga and Waiwhatawhata, Rawiri Tata said, 'go and tell your Pakeha that I have never surrendered, and will not surrender; I will yet drive them all into the sea.' Pene Taka's language was even more violent; so that I do not see the least hope of their listening to reason." He added that "the are expecting large reinforcements from the Thames and Mataora."

After receiving reports that an armed party led by Hakaraia had marched to Taumata, the reluctant Te Ranapia was sent to investigate. "He has returned," Clarke wrote, "and states that old Hakaraia with his contingent is in the district, that he is resolved to drive the Pakeha into the sea; he has with him, it is reported this evening, a force of 150 men." According to Clarke, Hakaraia was expecting reinforcements but had not yet joined forces with Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi.<sup>182</sup>

These reports prompted Haultain to send for reinforcements. In late January a company of the 1st Waikato Regiment arrived by steamer from Opotiki. These soldiers, however, appeared to be more interested in drinking than fighting. "There was literally not one sober man amongst them last night," he lamented, "and only 38 could be got together to march out to camp this morning, some of them talking of their discharges, as they have served three years."<sup>183</sup> At the same time William Mair was instructed to raise a contingent of Te Arawa and march immediately to Te Puke where the houses and adjacent cultivations were to be destroyed as a special punishment to

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<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

<sup>181</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 15 January 1867.

<sup>182</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 28 January 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.44.

<sup>183</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.



Hakaraia. The kupapa troops were then to proceed to Oropi and await further orders.<sup>184</sup>

The terrain around Tauranga was believed to give local Maori a distinct advantage: "narrow tongues of land separated by steep and impassable gullies from 200 to 500 feet deep, running up far into the Bush, any one of which will offer two or three or more positions as difficult as Thermopylae."<sup>185</sup> It was hoped that the Pai Marire force could be engaged in more open country closer to Te Papa, but in the meantime, another operation to the west of the Wairoa river was scheduled for 30 January.

Haultain reported that "in consequence of the insolence of the Pirirakaus in refusing to listen to our messenger, and in setting us altogether at defiance, I am sending another expedition tonight under Col. Harington to destroy much of their cultivations as he can manage in two days, remaining there tomorrow night." He believed that "they deserve severe chastisement, and I wish to inflict it before they get reinforcement."<sup>186</sup> According to the strategy developed by Haultain, after defeating Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi the government force would turn its attention to Hakaraia and his contingent at Taumata and Akeake.

## 6.6 Disciplinary problems

Events on the morning of the planned raid indicated that the government force was hardly in the position to inflict the much vaunted chastisement upon Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi. Most of the 1st Waikato Regiment had enjoyed the hospitality of various public houses at Te Papa during the previous evening and did not attend the parade called by Harington. Moreover, the armed party of Ngaiterangi struck for higher pay, but after having their arms and ammunition impounded, the strikers meekly returned to their duties.

In response to these rather alarming lapses of discipline, Haultain decided to postpone the operation to the west of the Wairoa river and instead concentrate on attacking Taumata and Akeake before Hakaraia was reinforced. He believed that "if the Hauhaus receive the reinforcements they expect, before we can get at them, and erect any kind of entrenchment, they will be too strong for our present force to attack." Indeed, the Defence Minister fervently hoped that "in their present demented fanatical state of

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<sup>184</sup> Haultain to Mair, 25 January 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.45.

<sup>185</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*

mind, they may be led to commit some act of folly, as they did at Napier, which will put them in our power.”<sup>187</sup>

Haultain no doubt hoped that the Te Arawa force would not prove to be so troublesome. After all, they were said to be “eager for the fray.”<sup>188</sup> However, he soon found himself embroiled in another pay dispute with kupapa troops. Some 200 warriors had been enrolled to join the government force at Tauranga but most of the Te Arawa force immediately went on strike for higher pay if Kenana was to be attacked from the direction of Rotorua. With the 40 men who had not been on strike, William Mair proceeded to Te Puke. After the recovery of some survey equipment, the settlement was destroyed in accordance with instructions.<sup>189</sup>

Meanwhile, the disgruntled members of the Te Arawa force marched along the beach to Tauranga in order to meet with the Defence Minister. “The remainder (160) came on by the beach and I had a korero with them,” Haultain told Stafford, “and found them anxious to assist us, but determined to drive a hard bargain, and I had to promise them an extra 6d. a day - i.e. they are to receive 3/- each but are to find their own provisions after the first two days.” In addition, the kupapa troops were offered “£5-0-0 a head for every live Hauhau they captured. They said it was no use taking prisoners, as we let them go again, but I promised that they should all be despatched to the Chatham Islands.”<sup>190</sup> The engagement of the Te Arawa force was welcome news to many local settlers who believed that kupapa troops were critical to the success of the campaign. As one commentator observed, “if this tribe unite cordially to fight against the Hauhau in Tauranga the affair will soon be over : if they hold back, it may prove a serious business.”<sup>191</sup>

In late January the settler press criticised the government for provoking the conflict and then failing to secure any decisive victory. *The Daily Southern Cross* regretted that the repeated warnings to stop the surveys were ignored by the authorities, “and the consequence has been, as was to be expected, a serious collision between the colonial forces and refractory natives.” Moreover, three Pakeha had been killed in battle with no apparent loss on the part of Maori, and while the settlements of Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi had been destroyed, the Pai Marire force still held the upper hand: “they can harass and worry our people with comparative impunity; and it will only be by the employment of a corps of bushrangers aided by a contingent of friendly natives that the men in arms against us can be successfully dealt with.”

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<sup>187</sup> Haultain to Hall, 30 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>188</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>189</sup> Gifford and Williams, op.cit., p.295.

<sup>190</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 2 February 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>191</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 28 January 1867.

## 6.7 Campaign against Hakaraia

On 1 February the government force marched to Pye's Pa to prepare for the assault on Taumata with local hostilities rather than the enemy the most significant threat to the manoeuvre. "I got all my men (about 270) to Pye's Pah without opposition from the Hauhaus," Haultain told Stafford, "but with some difficulty as they wanted to get into the town for another drinking bout."<sup>192</sup> In order to prevent a repetition of the debacle which had occurred a few days earlier, a contingent of the 12th Regiment was posted around the outskirts of Te Papa to prevent the 1st Waikato Regiment from engaging in further episodes of heavy drinking.

Upon arriving at Pye's Pa, the government force attempted to surround the whare at Kahakaharoa, where a Pai Marire force was believed to be garrisoned. The Te Arawa force advanced to the front of the pa while the 1st Waikato Regiment and the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps moved to the rear. The dense bush prevented a complete encirclement, and in any event, the position had already been abandoned. On 2 February Haultain reported that "the Hauhaus however evacuated it last night, and the Arawas took possession this morning, finding about 2 tons of potatoes and a variety of articles, shewing that they had quitted in a great hurry. It had been occupied by at least 100 men."<sup>193</sup>

The garrison at the Omanawa redoubt had been seriously depleted by the deployment of the 1st Waikato Regiment and the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps to Pye's Pa. In order to prevent Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi from crossing the Wairoa river and attacking the right flank of the government force at Taumata, the 1st Class Militia was called out for duty at the Omanawa redoubt. According to Haultain, "instead of 115 who are on the roll, only 17 men turned out, and I had no means of coercing them at the moment."<sup>194</sup> A request for assistance was sent to Hamilton who responded by immediately sending a company of the 12th Regiment to patrol along the Wairoa river.

The assault on Taumata was to take place on 4 February. The 1st Waikato Regiment and the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps, together with a small contingent of kupapa, were to attack from the direction of Pye's Pa. The main Te Arawa force was to move from their position at Kahakaharoa supported by another company of the 12th Regiment. Haultain warned Stafford that "as they are at the very edge of the bush we cannot expect to secure many of

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<sup>192</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 2 February 1867, Stafford Papers, , MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

them, but if we succeed in driving them back we shall follow them up, and destroy their settlements and as much of their cultivations as possible." Meanwhile, another group of Te Arawa was engaged to occupy Kenana. The Defence Minister instructed them to "eat and destroy as much of [Hakaraia's] food as possible."<sup>195</sup>

## 6.8 Assault on Taumata

On the morning of 4 February the government force advanced on Taumata. Hakaraia was aware of the planned attack from the flanks and his contingent simultaneously opened fire on both columns from positions near Akeake and Maenene. The engagement lasted for approximately half an hour before the Pai Marire force retired to Taumata. Haultain reported that "we had some sharp skirmishing in the deep wooded gully between [Maenene] and [Akeake] and had two men wounded, one severely through the hip. The Hauhaus lost one man, and they tell me that a second was wounded."<sup>196</sup>

Taumata was then attacked from two sides, and after a brief exchange of fire, Hakaraia and his followers moved deep into the surrounding bush. Five women and a young boy were captured during the fighting and taken to Te Papa: "very little reliable information could be obtained from the prisoners. They stated that Hakaraia was there with a force of only fifty-nine men; that the reinforcements had not then arrived. They could give no account of the losses of the Hauhaus as they, the women, were sent away before the firing commenced."<sup>197</sup> After securing control of Taumata, the Te Arawa force was sent to Oropi and Paengaroa. Although the kupapa troops encountered some resistance, both settlements were captured without any loss to either side.

The government force spent the next week burning the houses and destroying the cultivations at Akeake, Maenene, Taumata, Oropi and Paengaroa. Haultain reported that the colonial troops remained "out in the Bush, destroying the cultivations and following up the Hauhaus, which last the Arawas have accomplished very thoroughly, completely driving them out of the Districts, and burning all their settlements as far as Kaimai on the other side of the Wairoa."<sup>198</sup> The Te Arawa force, unlike the 1st Waikato Regiment and the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps, were allowed to plunder the settlements. A large quantity of gunpowder was discovered hidden in the fern at Oropi while a chest full of papers and books were found at Akeake. The kupapa troops also seized a dozen flags including a Pai Marire standard that had been given to Hakaraia by Tawhiao.

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

<sup>196</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 4 February 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 8 February 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

## 7. The Final Phase

### 7.1 Ministerial doubts

By early February Haultain felt the need to explain the lack of military success to his colleagues in Wellington. He told the Premier that the Kaimai ranges afforded ample escape routes to local Maori : "we can only travel along tracks in single file, and those attacked can always make good their retreat. The fern is almost worse than the Bush, for in the back country it is very luxuriant and higher than a man's head, and when out of the track a man cannot see two yards in front of him." He hoped that Stafford approved of his strategy of "punishing the Hauhaus by destroying their property, as we cannot expect to make much impression on them in any other way, so long as they keep to the bush."<sup>199</sup>

Haultain also believed that the commanding officer of the 1st Waikato Regiment lacked the necessary attributes for waging a successful campaign in the bush: "Harington has many good qualifications as a soldier, but he is rather too easy-going and inert for the kind of work we are now engaged in, never having seen service before, and with the prospect of the [Urewera] making an attack in some other direction, it would not be prudent for me to leave the district."<sup>200</sup>

By 11 February most of the government force had arrived at the Omanawa redoubt in preparation for another attack on the settlements of Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi. Although unable to acquire any accurate intelligence about the movements of the enemy, the military did not believe that the Pai Marire force had been reinforced to any great extent. Heavy rain and widespread flooding delayed the expedition by several days. According to *The Tauranga Argus*, "all operations were totally futile in consequence of the enormous torrents of rain falling during the succeeding three days, in fact the discomfiture of the camp, the utter dejectedness of the place, rendered the service one of downright misery."<sup>201</sup>

The 1st Waikato Regiment and the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps, together with an increased Te Arawa force, were to launch an attack from the Omanawa redoubt. Meanwhile, two companies of the 12th Regiment were to be landed at the mouth of the Te Puna stream and launch an assault from the opposite direction. This strategy was intended to divide the Pai Marire force by creating a front at both Irihanga and Waiwhatawhata. These tactics were

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<sup>199</sup> Ibid.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> *The Tauranga Argus*, 16 February 1867.

modified after the military received confirmation that Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi had not been joined by a large contingent of Ngati Raukawa as feared. As there was a sufficient number of colonial troops available for an operation against the relatively small Pai Marire force, the 12th Regiment was told to remain at Te Papa.

Although he acknowledged the difficulty of the terrain, Haultain remained confident of securing a victory against the Pai Marire force. "I anticipate no great difficulty in dealing with them," he predicted, "but hope to cut off and capture not a few, and I have every reason to calculate on soon bringing our operations to a thoroughly successful termination - as we shall turn upon [Hakaraia's] party immediately after settling accounts with the others."<sup>202</sup> At this stage Hakaraia was reported to be at Paengaroa.

## 7.2 Return to Irihanga

On the afternoon of 14 February the government force left the Omanawa redoubt and crossed the Wairoa river. After marching through dense bush in heavy rain for most of the day, the colonial troops camped overnight near the Ruangarara stream. Meanwhile, the Pai Marire force had flattened the ferns on the side of the track leading to Irihanga in order to fire upon the enemy from strong positions in the bush. As Cowan later pointed out, "this was done in order to enable the defenders of the hill to fire destructive volleys while the attackers were passing over the ground between the summit and the bush - a task of difficulty and slowness on account of the artful manner in which the fern had been pressed over."<sup>203</sup>

Early the following morning, the government force advanced along the track to attack Irihanga. *The Tauranga Argus* reported that "Major St John with Captain Skeet and his engineers were first up, and to all appearances no Hauhaus were there, on reaching the skirt of the bush, however, the Hauhaus, who were in ambush, opened fire which was briskly returned."<sup>204</sup> The advance guard immediately took cover and were unable to advance until reinforced by kupapa troops. By this time the Pai Marire force had already abandoned their positions along the track and moved into the bush between Irihanga and Whakamarama.

During the subsequent fighting "the Arawas had three men wounded, one Hauhau known to be killed, his body being found, others from certain

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<sup>202</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 13 February 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>203</sup> Cowan, *op.cit.*, p.156.

<sup>204</sup> *The Tauranga Argus*, 16 February 1867.

sanguinary signs evidently severely wounded.”<sup>205</sup> The government force halted at Whakamarama with the bulk of the Te Arawa force promptly returning to Irihanga in order to arrange for the transportation of the wounded to Te Papa.

### 7.3 Ambush at Te Ranga

Shortly afterwards, the pickets posted around the outskirts of Whakamarama were attacked with several sentries wounded. The Pai Marire force clearly wanted to draw the 1st Waikato Regiment and the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps further into the bush where another ambush had been planned near Te Ranga. Haultain obliged by ordering the advance guard to move along a narrow track heading towards the settlement.

A correspondent reported that “on entering this path the enemy doggedly defended every yard of ground, the firing being heavy and incessant.” The colonial troops suffered heavy casualties during the engagement: “about a quarter of a mile in the bush Mr T. Jordan, belonging to Captain Skeet’s company, fell mortally wounded, dying almost immediately. Farther on a volunteer from Opotiki, named Jeffs, was shot through the head, death instantaneous. Three others, Magnus, Stewart and McMahan were severely wounded.”<sup>206</sup> Te Ranga was eventually captured with all the whare reduced to ashes.

The colonial troops subsequently camped at Irihanga for the next three days in order to scour the bush for the enemy and destroy the remaining cultivations.<sup>207</sup> “The force remains out,” Haultain told Stafford, “to follow up the rebels and destroy their cultivations.”<sup>208</sup> The crops at Irihanga and Whakamarama were “pretty effectually destroyed. The potatoes have been dug up, and left on the surface of the ground to spoil, and the wheat has been torn up and partly burned.”<sup>209</sup> In addition, the Te Arawa force sacked the village of Poripori. On 20 February the government force returned to the Omanawa redoubt “having destroyed all the Pirirakau settlements and not having seen a rebel since the day of the attack.”<sup>210</sup> By this time Haultain had been informed that the Stafford ministry was “determined to stamp out the threatened rebellion in this District, and I am glad to say that I believe this has very nearly been accomplished.”<sup>211</sup>

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205 Ibid.

206 Ibid.

207 W Mair, Journal, 18 February 1867, MS 1466-1468, ATL.

208 Haultain to Stafford, 15 February 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

209 *The Daily Southern Cross*, 25 February 1867.

210 Haultain to Stafford, 20 February 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

211 Ibid.

## 7.4 Bush scouring

The Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps and the Te Arawa force were ordered to search the area around the upper reaches of the Wairoa river to establish whether Hakaraia was still in the district. On 22 February the expedition reached Taumata, and although the settlement was deserted, there were signs of recent occupation.<sup>212</sup> The bulk of the colonial troops then moved to Paengaroa where they spent the next few days destroying the extensive cultivations.

Meanwhile, an advance guard marched to Kaimai which was also unoccupied. Shortly after entering the settlement "the Arawas were everywhere, but had little success in the way of loot, the people having taken most of their things."<sup>213</sup> After burning all the houses and some of the corn at Kaimai, the party rejoined the others at Paengaroa before the whole expedition returned to Te Papa. According to a local correspondent, "Kaimai is, or rather was, a lovely and bountiful place. Clear streams run in the forest gullies, while in the clearings were fields of gigantic maize, acres of potatoes, and groves of peach trees, laden with splendid fruit."<sup>214</sup> Similarly, William Mair described Kaimai as "a remarkably fine village."<sup>215</sup>

At the end of the month, Haultain reported that the colonial troops "had completely scoured the whole District, and the Arawas had been out for three days on both sides of the upper part of the Wairoa destroying and looting everything they could come across."<sup>216</sup> The size of the government force was reduced with about 150 men of the 1st Waikato Regiment discharged from active service and over 100 warriors from Te Arawa sent back to Rotorua at their own request. Haultain expected the surveyors to be able to return to work within a matter of days.<sup>217</sup>

By the first week of March two survey parties had in fact resumed work on the Waimapu block.<sup>218</sup> Kupapa troops were stationed at Paengaroa and patrolled the surrounding countryside. Clarke reported that "the Arawas who remained in the district numbered 120; with these Mr Mair was directed to march to Paengaroa with the double object of covering the surveyors, who have been again set to work on the 'undisputed' confiscated block, and to

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<sup>212</sup> W Mair, Journal, 18 February 1867, MS 1466-1468, ATL.

<sup>213</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 28 February 1867.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>215</sup> W Mair, Journal, 24 February 1867, MS 1466-1468, ATL.

<sup>216</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 28 February 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>217</sup> Skeet to Heaphy, Memorandum, 23 February 1867, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

<sup>218</sup> Skeet to Heaphy, Memorandum, 4 March 1867, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL; Jenks, *op.cit.*, pp.36-37.



watch the movements of the hostile Natives then supposed to be in the occupation of the Kaimai."<sup>219</sup>

On 3 March a party of Te Arawa was ambushed near Te Kaki with the resulting skirmish lasting half an hour and both sides suffering some casualties.<sup>220</sup> By this time, approximately 100 warriors from Te Arawa had returned from Rotorua and joined their kinsmen at Paengaroa. On 9 March the remaining men of the 1st Waikato Regiment marched from the Omanawa redoubt to Kaimai while the Te Arawa force moved from Paengaroa to Te Kaki. Both settlements were found to be unoccupied but there were reports that the enemy was hiding in the surrounding bush. According to Clarke, Hakaraia had intended to occupy Te Kaki, "it is one most difficult of access, and in the face of a large opposing force would be almost impregnable."<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> Clarke to Richmond, 12 March 1867, *AJHR*, 1867, A-20, p.50.

<sup>220</sup> W Mair, *Journal*, 3 March 1867, MS 1466-1468, ATL.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*

## 8. The Aftermath of War

### 8.1 A state of uncertainty

By early March all the devastated settlements had been reoccupied by the hapu of Ngati Ranginui. "There is no doubt as to the return of the Hauhaus," wrote Haultain, "as their fires have been seen at all places in the Bush from which we had previously driven them."<sup>222</sup> There was a discernible feeling of despair among the inhabitants of Te Papa. According to *The Daily Southern Cross*, "the general opinion at Tauranga would appear to be that the 'war', as the miserable struggle there is called, will end in destroying the settlement, which might have been thriving and prosperous if it had been left alone."<sup>223</sup>

The scheme of military settlement was a failure with only a handful of soldiers engaged in farming. "This is not to be wondered at," observed a local reporter, "there is no protection beyond the Gate Pa, and the land of some men is in the bush beyond Paengaroa, where it would be madness for any man to go at present."<sup>224</sup> Similarly, Haultain reported that "no progress has been made in the way of settlement, and it never can be an agricultural District." The Defence Minister believed that most members of the 1st Waikato Regiment lacked the attributes of a successful military settler: "there is an average amount of courage in all bodies of men, about one third have real pluck, one third are rank cowards and the remainder something between the two (but they will follow if well led). The last two will not settle in the face of hostile neighbours."<sup>225</sup>

Local settlers were quick to blame the government for the state of uncertainty that had descended over the district. One commentator believed that the Stafford ministry would never be able to defeat the Pai Marire force so long as Haultain remained in command. His lack of ability was evidenced by the fact that "notwithstanding our superiority of arms and numbers, we have had to abandon a great extent of country to the Hauhaus; and all we have succeeded in doing was killing some eight or nine men, with equal loss on our side, and destroying much valuable food, thereby impoverishing the country. This is neither war nor victory. It is defeat and wanton waste."<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 11 March 1867.

<sup>224</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 27 April 1867. For further information on the failure of the military settlement of Tauranga see Paul Spyve, *The First Waikato Regiment and the Settlement Process of the Bay of Plenty 1864-1874*, M.Soc.Sci Thesis, University of Waikato, 1981.

<sup>225</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 28 March 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047.

<sup>226</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 22 March 1867.

The tactics employed by the Defence Minister were said to be flawed because the incomplete destruction of crops and incineration of houses did not in any material degree deprive the hapu of Ngati Ranginui of either sustenance or shelter. *The Daily Southern Cross* lamented that "our forces have not been able to occupy an acre of the ground we visited with fire and sword. We have retreated, and now occupy the fortified camps at Tauranga and Opotiki, and nothing more. The settlement of the district has been thrown back several years, and the war spirit kindled in the natives, which it will require time and reverses to allay."<sup>227</sup>

Local settlers were also concerned at the evident discontent in the ranks of the 1st Waikato Regiment. Although still obliged to serve, most men would only attend parades under compulsion, "their sympathies and feelings being on the side of the natives, who have been unjustly treated by the Government."<sup>228</sup> Moreover, the 12th Regiment was scheduled to leave Tauranga in early April, with the defence of Te Papa to be placed in the hands of an increasingly unreliable militia. As Haultain observed, "the people here are desponding at the prospect of all the 12th going away immediately, and if the Hauhaus come again into the District I believe the settlement will be abandoned."<sup>229</sup>

## 8.2 Survey contracts

In early March the government attempted to resume the survey of the confiscated territory. By the middle of the month, however, work had stopped after Te Arawa warriors and men from the 1st Waikato Regiment had gone to Rotorua to reinforce Ngati Whakaue who had been attacked by a combined force led by Hakaraia. The departure of the only available armed guard prompted Haultain to order the survey parties to return to Te Papa.<sup>230</sup> In addition, the Provincial Surveyor reported that in accordance with earlier instructions, the survey of land to the west of the Wairoa river would be delayed indefinitely. The government had decided that no military settlers would be placed on farm sections at Te Puna.<sup>231</sup>

Although Haultain realised that the survey parties could not begin work without suitable protection, he thought that surveys in the district could not be allowed to come to a complete standstill. On 18 March the surveyors at

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

<sup>228</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 8 April 1867.

<sup>229</sup> Haultain to Stafford, 28 March 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.

<sup>230</sup> Skeet, Memorandum, 23 March 1867, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

<sup>231</sup> Mackay to Warner, 16 November 1866, AD 1/67/2364; Skeet to Haultain, 1 April 1867, AD 1/67/3545, NA.

Tauranga were offered a contract to survey the Te Puna Katikati block for military settlers. The terms and conditions of the proposed agreement stipulated that the surveyors were to work at their own risk and would only be paid for completed plans.<sup>232</sup> Gundry told Haultain that "owing to the probability, almost amounting to certainty of interruption from the Natives, and the necessity of keeping covering parties we cannot see our way clear to accept your offer with any probability of the work paying us."<sup>233</sup>

### 8.3 Government force on defensive

In early April the 12th Regiment departed Tauranga and begun the long journey back to England. By this time Haultain had returned to Wellington with Harington resuming overall command of the military in the district. After abandoning the more exposed positions at Pye's Pa and Omanawa, the 1st Waikato Regiment was stationed at Te Papa and Gate Pa, while the Te Arawa force garrisoned the Judea redoubt. *The Daily Southern Cross* observed that "one of the positions is to be at the Gate Pa, another at Judea, and another at Mr Turner's house, below Judea, so that at Rotorua and at this place we are reduced to act on the defensive - an ignominious termination to the campaign."

The colonial troops patrolled around the outskirts of the township but there was not enough soldiers for any further offensive operations. As *The Daily Southern Cross* noted, "the consequence is that this vast district of Tauranga, after all the blood that has been spilt and treasure expended, for the present will revert into the hands of the enemy."<sup>234</sup>

Ngati Ranginui were quick to take advantage of the defensive stance adopted by the government force. A correspondent reported that "the Hauhaus have entire charge of Tauranga, outside the township, and may be seen quietly riding leisurely about."<sup>235</sup> The military settlers who had taken up their farm sections were now even more vulnerable to attack. Despite living under the watchful gaze of the garrison at Gate Pa, Private Fielding of the 1st Waikato Regiment narrowly escaped injury after several snipers fired at him from the surrounding bush. He seems to have been attacked partly because of his previous association with the survey parties that worked in the area: "it appears, on inquiry, that Fielding is called by the natives a surveyor,

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232 Skeet to Gundry and others, 18 March 1867, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

233 Gundry and others to Skeet, 18 March 1867, AD 1/67/2879, NA.

234 *The Daily Southern Cross*, 19 March 1867.

235 *The Daily Southern Cross*, 25 March 1867.

inasmuch as he was a servant of Lieutenant Turner for a very considerable time, who surveyed the whole of the Waimapu block."<sup>236</sup>

Pirirakau used the opportunity to replenish their food supplies. At the mouth of the Te Puna stream a local reporter saw "several of the Pirirakau who had come down from their station in the bush to gather pipis, and very likely get fish and other things from the Ngaiterangi living in neighbouring settlements." Rawiri Tata and Penetaka also attended a tangi for Tomika Te Mutu at Motuhua. Contrary to some reports, Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi remained defiant despite three months of warfare and the devastation of their settlements. Rawiri Tata asked Te Puru, a Ngaiterangi chief, "how anxious are you to make peace! You are tired of this, and weak, and getting weaker. We will not stop till we kindle our fires on the banks of Te Papa harbour."<sup>237</sup>

#### 8.4 Provincial government peace initiative

The provincial government was anxious to secure the future of the ailing district. Whitaker, the Superintendent of the Auckland Province, travelled to Tauranga in May to hold peace talks with local Maori. As *The Daily Southern Cross* observed, "negotiations, which it is fervently to be hoped will lead to the pacification of the district, have been initiated." Members of Ngaiterangi and Te Arawa assembled at the mission house to meet with Whitaker: "from the Gate Pa and Judea also the Arawas came in crowds ; and from the west-end settlements, several large canoes, decorated for the occasion, came completely filled. On the preceding day about seventy of the principal Arawa chiefs had come down from Rotorua, so that there was a larger number of natives at Te Papa than there had been for very many years."<sup>238</sup>

Hohepa Hikutaia addressed the meeting "dressed in the uniform in which he has taken part in the recent engagements, and, brandishing a Government revolver, he said, 'I am a friend of the Europeans, and have fought for them.'" Although critical of the manner in which the confiscation had been implemented, he emphasised that his tribe was loyal to the Crown: "those people in the ranges are not our tribe; these are the Ngaiterangi sitting here."

Whitaker responded by saying that the confiscation was a matter for the Governor and that he merely represented the settlers of the Auckland province. He believed that the destruction of cultivations and decline in trade had been caused by "that desire for bloodshed which belonged to former times, when tribe fought against tribe, and men went so far as to eat each

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<sup>236</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 8 April 1867.

<sup>237</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 7 May 1867.

<sup>238</sup> *The Daily Southern Cross*, 20 May 1867.

other. The Queen's law came to put a stop to that evil, and yet now we see nothing but disturbance where once we saw industry and the enjoyment of that industry." The meeting was told that when "you have no disputes among yourselves as to ownership, all you have to do is to proceed to the Land Court and let the case be heard, and the title will be issued. That is the way to do it, instead of fighting and killing each other."<sup>239</sup>

The assembled chiefs of Ngaiterangi and Te Arawa retired to discuss the matters raised by Whitaker. During the evening several settlers suggested that some effort should be made to arrange a meeting between the Superintendent of the Auckland Province and the leaders of the Pai Marire force. Enoka Te Whanake, Te Kuka and Te Puru were asked if they would travel to the Kaimai ranges. According to *The Daily Southern Cross*, "they said they were ready to go, but would like to see the Superintendent first, to get his assurance that the men would be safe if they came to Te Papa."<sup>240</sup>

A private interview was held on the following morning. Enoka Te Whanake told Whitaker that "if you say the Arawas are to go and fetch them with their guns, we shall go and help them, if the people in the bush will not come. I did not hear anything you said yesterday that you intended to go, but you say now, 'Go', and I will go." Whitaker said that he had come to Tauranga because of the troubles "in the woods which are preventing people from going on with their work. I should be glad to see these people, and if you can help me I will thank you." Paul Tuhaere, a Ngati Whatua chief and member of the Executive Council, told Ngaiterangi that "if your friends the Hauhaus will agree, I am certain of this, that Tauranga will be a great place - will be, as it was, a great agricultural place. War never brought clothing to a man's back nor food to his belly, but always put blood in his face. Now the people of Tauranga will be made united if you here will go and get the other portion of the Tauranga inhabitants, and bring them back to peace."<sup>241</sup>

The three Ngaiterangi chiefs subsequently headed for Te Puna in order to persuade Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi to surrender. After being challenged by three armed warriors, they were taken to the mouth of the Te Puna stream where about 30 people were gathering seafood. Te Kuka suggested that a meeting should be held to discuss the message sent by Whitaker. A correspondent reported that "a priest said that their God must first be consulted, and, after jabbering for some time, he declared that the word of the Atua was that a few should go down for the pipis, while the others should return to hear the message. This, it must be allowed, was a common sense arrangement on the part of the Hauhau Atua."<sup>242</sup>

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239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 Ibid.

242 Ibid.

Within two hours about 40 or 50 people from Pirirakau, Ngati Rangi and Ngati Porou had gathered at Waiwhatawhata. Te Kuka said that Whitaker recommended that they surrender and live in peace with their Maori and Pakeha neighbours. A member of Ngati Porou responded by saying they would not surrender. According to *The Daily Southern Cross*, "Penetaka at once said firmly, 'Stop that kind of talk; we have had enough of it. If you do persist, we will bury all of the Ngatiporou here on this hill.'" Tawhiao had apparently refused a request for reinforcements and advised an immediate cessation of hostilities.

A number of leading chiefs, including Penetaka, Rawiri Tata and Te Kepa Ringatu, volunteered to visit Whitaker at Te Papa. After being informed that he may have already returned to Auckland, they refused to travel to Te Papa for fear of being seized by the local authorities. As a local reporter noted, "there is a warrant out against Penetaka for stealing one of the surveyor's chains, but of course no attempt will be made to execute it if he comes in."<sup>243</sup> In any event, the negotiations initiated by the provincial government soon came to an unsuccessful conclusion.

#### 8.4 Proposed expedition

The Stafford ministry continued to pursue the subjugation of Ngati Ranginui by military methods. In early May Harington was instructed to make every effort to gather intelligence about the Kingitanga which was said to be once again threatening the peace of the district. Haultain issued orders that "should there be a body of rebels at Whakamarama, an Expeditionary Force of the Arawas and Militia should be immediately sent to dislodge them, but you will understand that the Arawas cannot be retained in the District for an indefinite time to protect the Town from possible attack."<sup>244</sup>

While Harington admitted that he had received conflicting reports on the movements of Ngati Ranginui, he did not believe that any further military operations were warranted in the circumstances: "no aggressive movement has been made on the settlers of this district since the departure of the Imperial Troops and I therefore deem it most inexpedient to renew hostilities at a time when a large meeting is being held to discuss the question of peace or war."<sup>245</sup> Clarke disputed such a cautious assessment and advocated sending a military expedition to Whakamarama. He firmly believed that "the stores of provisions they have collected ought to be destroyed, as it will be

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>244</sup> Holt to Harington, 1 May 1867, Le1/1867/120, NA.

<sup>245</sup> Harington to Holt, 14 May 1867, Le1/1867/120, NA.

impossible for a large hostile force to be maintained in the District without food."<sup>246</sup>

Harington was severely criticised for not sending the colonial troops to attack Whakamarama. "I have to express my entire disapproval of your inaction," Haultain thundered, "which was in direct opposition to the advice and remonstrance of Mr Clarke, who distinctly informed you that Hau Haus were there, and that he had reason to believe they had collected surplus supplies of provisions, and that it was most desirable to strike a blow whilst the Arawas were available."<sup>247</sup> In June Harington was directed to consult with Clarke on the necessity of an expedition to the settlements of Pirirakau and Ngati Rangi. The Defence Minister stated that "should you be mutually agreed as to the necessity for reinforcements, you are to employ a sufficient number of Arawas and Ngaiterangi to take the field with the Militia and to expel the Rebels from the District."<sup>248</sup>

Harington sent Goldsmith to the frontier to ascertain the accuracy of reports that there were hostile movements in the Kaimai ranges. Goldsmith was accompanied only by a handful of men from the 1st Waikato Regiment, and in stark contrast to the scouting expedition at the beginning of the year, the party carefully avoided any armed engagements with Ngati Ranginui. Goldsmith did not cross the Wairoa river "lest the Natives might distort the occurrence into another casus belli, but I despatched a trusty scout in whom I could rely." Haultain was informed that "the only places on our frontier in which Natives are present is at Whakamarama, these are a small party who are engaged removing into the interior the corpses of their countrymen who have been buried at or near Whakamarama. With this exception not one openly hostile Native is on our frontier."<sup>249</sup>

## 8.5 Completion of survey

From the perspective of Haultain, this report was sufficiently encouraging to warrant the resumption of surveys at Waimapu, although Clarke maintained that the safety of surveyors could not yet be guaranteed. By early August the survey parties had once again been forced to return to Te Papa. Skeet reported that the survey of the Oropi block had been stopped on the orders of Haultain, "it being impossible to work without any large covering parties."<sup>250</sup> Rather than remain unemployed, a number of surveyors, including William

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<sup>246</sup> Clarke to Harington, 14 May 1867, Le 1/1867/120, NA.

<sup>247</sup> Haultain to Harington, 23 May 1867, Le 1/1867/120, NA.

<sup>248</sup> Haultain to Harington, 11 June 1867, Le 1/1867/120, NA.

<sup>249</sup> Goldsmith to Haultain, 20 June 1867, Le 1/1867/120, NA.

<sup>250</sup> Skeet to Heale, 14 August 1867, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.



Gundry, an officer in the Auckland Volunteers Engineer Corps, decided to accept the earlier offer from Haultain to start work on the Te Puna Katikati block.<sup>251</sup>

Harington and Clarke maintained that the surveyors could be placed in danger by working beyond the Te Puna stream. However, their superiors in Wellington, Haultain and Richmond, authorised the work to proceed so long as the survey parties were armed and followed instructions in the event of any disturbance, with the operation viewed as strictly a private venture. As Heale pointed out to Skeet, "the work if done, was to be undertaken by private surveyors, acting on their own discretion with the sanction of the Civil Commissioner, but not on his responsibility."

Although supportive of the operation, Heale was concerned about Harington issuing arms to the survey parties and Skeet accompanying the surveyors to the Katikati Te Puna block: "now to arm a party with Govt arms and to head it by a Govt officer, would whatever the intentions, be looked on all over the country as something very different from a mere survey. Reports of the expedition would fly about - it would be called a hostile inroad and it might be made a pretext or excuse for violent demonstrations anywhere. I must beg that all appearance of carrying out this work by force may be abandoned and disavowed."<sup>252</sup>

There were some official concerns about the survey of the Katikati Te Puna block. Clarke said that neither Skeet nor Gundry would tell him anything for fear that he would call a halt to the work. He viewed "the present attempt to carry out the survey of the purchased block with apprehension - It is a step which is attended not only with personal risk to the surveyors but may involve the peace of the district."<sup>253</sup> Moreover, Harington refused to issue arms to the surveyors as requested by Skeet until he had received clear instructions from the Defence Minister.<sup>254</sup>

Accompanied by Skeet and Te Moananui of Ngai Tamawhariua, the survey parties had started work to the west of the Te Puna stream by early October. Skeet told Harington that the "original cause of our correspondence viz ; my application for arms now no longer exists as from the peaceful attitude of the natives (Hauhau) I consider arms unnecessary." In order to deflect possible criticism from Heale about an official endorsement of the expedition, Skeet explained that "contracts were offered to certain surveyors on certain terms and with certain restrictions these terms are accepted by them entirely on their own responsibility and at their own risk - I am simply superintending as

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<sup>251</sup> Jenks, op.cit., p.37.

<sup>252</sup> Heale to Skeet, 26 September 1867, AD 1/67/3545, NA.

<sup>253</sup> Clarke to Harington, 3 October 1867, AD 1/67/3545, NA.

<sup>254</sup> Harington to Pollen, 24 September 1867, AD 1/67/ 3545, NA.

District Surveyor the work done by them to see it is done according to my instructions."<sup>255</sup>

Much to the relief of Clarke and Harington, the work proceeded without incident during October and November. Apart from Ngati Porou, Skeet believed that only Pirirakau would interfere with the survey parties: "Te Moananui himself is with my party so that I do not apprehend any danger. They are only a small band and quite outcasts from their own tribe (the Ngaiterangi)."<sup>256</sup> Skeet also travelled to Rereatukahia where Paratene promised "not to interfere with the Surveyors and pledging himself that should he at any time hear or know of any intended interruption by the Hauhaus of the work he would at once communicate with me."<sup>257</sup>

Skeet was told by Tupari of Pirirakau that the surveyors were not to cut lines through their settlements in the Kaimai ranges. Skeet reported that "this was of course at once acceded to, he also said that no sudden attack would be made upon the survey party but that if they wished to fight due notice would be given." He added that Pirirakau strenuously objected to "any accusation that might be made of their wish or intention to commit any underhand murder or make an unprovoked attack upon unarmed men not looking upon surveyors as soldiers but simply as peaceful workers."<sup>258</sup>

The survey of the confiscated territory continued throughout early 1868. The remaining surveyors, however, continued to face opposition from Maori. In April Potterton and Mitchell, accompanied by Skeet, started work on subdivisions at Paengaroa and Omanawa. They were told to stop work by Taora, but as Skeet did not consider the warning to be of any particular significance, the survey party continued with the subdivision. Another warning was sent to Skeet who sought advice from Hakopa. He told Skeet that "they (the Paengaroa natives) did not wish to interfere with the surveyors, but it was Taora and his friends who wished to interfere with them." Hakopa said that he would travel inland to "hear what the King said about it, and that they were to work till his return, when the surveyors should receive a final notice, one way or another."<sup>259</sup>

In May a notice was sent to the survey parties ordering the Maori labourers to stop work. These men "being very much frightened packed up their things" and immediately stopped work, while the surveyors "being left without

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<sup>255</sup> Skeet to Harington, 9 October 1867, AD 1/67/ 3545, NA.

<sup>256</sup> Skeet to Heale, 30 September 1867, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

<sup>257</sup> Skeet to Clarke, 9 October 1867, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

<sup>259</sup> Skeet to Clarke, 16 May 1868, Outward Letter Book, Survey Office, Tauranga, MS 18, TPL.

labour were forced to leave off.”<sup>260</sup> According to Jenks, the safety of the surveyors had been threatened, and “an aukati was declared close to their camp, effectively stopping all work once more.”<sup>261</sup> By the end of June, however, the bulk of confiscated land had been surveyed and subdivided, and in the following months the surveyors left Tauranga in search of new opportunities.

### 8.7 The continuing influence of Pai Marire

Local officials realised that military action had failed to suppress Pai Marire in Tauranga. In March 1868 Clarke reported that the hapu of Ngati Ranginui had returned to their settlements in the Kaimai ranges. He complained that “these returned rebels are not content to remain quiet. They commit all sorts of depredations upon the settlers. For instance, last week, several valuable horses were stolen, also sheep and cattle, and such is their boldness, that they come within the precincts of this township, and take by night horses out of the settlers’ paddocks.”<sup>262</sup>

Clarke also reported that another aukati had been placed over the confiscated territory. He observed that “these aukati are not intended to prevent the Hauhaus from coming to our settlements, nor prevent people of the Native race who have committed crimes punishable by our laws from taking refuge with their disaffected countrymen (two instances of this have occurred in this district), but simply to prevent our people from interfering with them.”<sup>263</sup>

The periodic visits of warships to Tauranga served to reassure concerned settlers and bolster government authority. For example, the *HMS Blanche* was anchored off Tauranga between December 1868 and January 1869. The harbour master reported that “the presence of a Man-of-War in this harbour has the salutary effect of overawing the excited Hauhau population of this district, which influence cannot last if we are left without a ship.” During December “some Hauhaus were in this town” and “spoke to the Arawa contingent of the departure of the ‘Blanche’ and made some enigmatic remarks as to the future.”<sup>264</sup> The *HMS Blanche* did not depart for Wellington until Te Arawa reinforcements had arrived from Rotorua.

In June 1869 the *HMS Blanche* stopped at Tauranga during a passage from Wellington to Auckland. According to the commanding officer, “on shore the

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<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> Jenks, op.cit., pp.40-41.

<sup>262</sup> HT Clarke, ‘Report on the State of the Natives’, op.cit., p.10.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

<sup>264</sup> Wilson to Montgomerie, 28 December 1868, Letterbook, *HMS Blanche*, MS 21, TPL.

settlers were uneasy about the proximity of Hauhaus", and the presence of "a Man-of-War at Tauranga, more especially lying off Te Papa, will instill much confidence among the Europeans and tend very much in deterring the Maoris from making an attack on the place."<sup>265</sup>

## 8.8 Visit of Te Kooti

In January 1870 Te Kooti and his followers visited Ngati Haua and Ngati Raukawa settlements on the western side of the Kaimai ranges. This area had become a place of refuge for many people of different tribal origins, and during his visit Te Kooti received support and assistance from Waitaha, Pirirakau and Ngati Rangī. In early February there was an armed encounter at Paengaroa between a Maori force under Te Kooti and the Armed Constabulary and Te Arawa led by Major Fraser. During the skirmish the colonial troops were outmanoeuvred and suffered several casualties; Te Kooti and his followers subsequently camped at Oropi before marching towards Rotorua with Gilbert Mair and the Arawa Flying Column in close pursuit.<sup>266</sup>

The presence of Te Kooti in the Kaimai ranges caused alarm amongst the settlers at Tauranga. The *HMS Blanche* was once again anchored in Tauranga harbour to assist with the protection of Te Papa, with 60 men from the vessel stationed at the Monmouth redoubt.<sup>267</sup> An uneasy calm returned to Tauranga after Te Kooti and his followers left the district. In June Lieutenant-Colonel Moule, the Inspector of the Armed Constabulary, reported that "the Hauhaus in the Tauranga and Opotiki Districts seem very peaceably disposed just now. The Pirirakaus, and the Ngati Rangis about Oropi and [Paengaroa], who for some time actively assisted Te Kooti, have abandoned him, and are now digging gum on Government land between Te Puna and [Katikati]."<sup>268</sup> Pirirakau and Ngati Rangī were no doubt of the opinion that they were working on land that belonged to themselves rather than the government.

The Kingitanga maintained a constant presence in Tauranga during this period. William Mair reported that "Manuera and Wiremu Parata of the Pirirakaus, came to this office as a deputation from the Hauhau and King party, to say that there were three things that they would not permit to encroach upon what they considered the 'King's country', viz: the 'road, the chain, and the wire'." They warned that if the telegraph line was extended across the Wairoa river "the posts would be cut down." Much to the chagrin

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<sup>265</sup> Montgomerie to Lambert, 29 June 1869, Letterbook, *HMS Blanche*, MS 21, TPL.

<sup>266</sup> Judith Binney, *Redemption Songs. A life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1995, pp.202-206; James Belich, op.cit., pp.283-284.

<sup>267</sup> Montgomerie to Lambert, 27 January 1870, Letterbook, *HMS Blanche*, MS 21, TPL.

<sup>268</sup> Moule to Commissioner, Armed Constabulary Force, 16 June 1870, *AJHR*, 1870, D-7, p.12.

of Mair, Manuera and his companion "talked in an easy satisfied manner and said they had not come to argue the matter, but merely to state their intentions, that it might not be said hereafter that they had been underhand."<sup>269</sup> Mair added that the villages of Paengaroa, Taumata and Akeake were all occupied.

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<sup>269</sup> Mair to Civil Commissioner, Auckland, 16 May 1870, *AJHR*, 1870, A-16, p.7.

## 9. Conclusion

### 9.1 Government objectives

In terms of realising stated objectives, the Tauranga Bush Campaign was something of a failure for the government. Haultain travelled to Tauranga in order to direct the capture of those individuals responsible for obstructing the survey parties. The Defence Minister thought that capturing the perpetrators would involve only a relatively small number of colonial troops in the field for a limited period of time. When the first expedition to the west of the Wairoa river failed to bring any prisoners back to the stockade at Te Papa, the conflict escalated into a campaign to inflict a crushing defeat upon Ngati Ranginui who would be forced to surrender and accept the terms of the confiscation.

In the euphemistic words of Haultain, the rebels would be "severely chastised". After securing the services of a Te Arawa force and receiving assistance from one of the few remaining imperial regiments in New Zealand, the colonial troops were still unable to secure a decisive victory during operations on both sides of the Wairoa river. By April 1867 the government had adopted a defensive position in Tauranga, with the Superintendent of the Auckland Province unsuccessfully attempting to secure peace in the district.

### 9.2 Armed resistance

From the perspective of Ngati Ranginui, the Tauranga Bush Campaign must be seen as a successful military operation. The government did not capture any of the chiefs named in the arrest warrants and there were only a handful of Maori casualties during the conflict. With little outside assistance and limited resources, Ngati Ranginui mounted a war effort which took advantage of the rugged terrain and exploited the weaknesses of the tactics adopted by the government force.

Despite overtures from the government, Ngati Ranginui were not forced to surrender after the conflict, and much to the chagrin of local officials, the influence of the Kingitanga remained undiminished in the Kaimai ranges. "The disaffected Natives have returned to their different settlements from whence they were driven," wrote Clarke, "but they refuse to submit, although repeatedly invited to do so. They state that they owe allegiance to the Maori King, and that they will obey his orders only."<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> Ibid.

Local officials invariably characterised Ngati Ranginui as recalcitrant rebels who refused to honour the agreements negotiated at Motuhoa. They were viewed as part of a dangerous and violent creed which was determined to remove Pakeha from the Western Bay of Plenty. In fact, the aims of Ngati Ranginui were modestly directed towards preventing their ancestral land being confiscated. There was bitter opposition to the western and southern boundaries of the confiscated territory as determined by the government, and the proclamation of the aukati along the Wairoa river and the construction of the whare at Oropi and Kahakaharoa represented an assertion that the land remained under the mana of Ngati Ranginui.

### 9.3 A question of authority

The dispute over the boundaries of the confiscated territory was a fundamental conflict between two competing forms of authority. As Rawiri Tata once pointed out to Mackay, the matter properly rested with the representatives of the Kingitanga and the Crown. For Ngati Ranginui, the Kingitanga embodied the right of hapu to retain their land and autonomy. Given that much of the area surrounding Tauranga had earlier been placed under the mana of Tawhiao, the process of creeping confiscation would inevitably be resisted by local Maori. In short, the fighting that took place from Te Ranga to Oropi was about substantive sovereignty rather than millenarian prophecies. As Tareha Kiharoa observed, "the cause is an old one, and is the power of the island (Te mana o te motu nei)."

The first protests were peaceful and involved impounding equipment and removing markers, but when the government persisted in cutting the lines, the survey parties were forcibly expelled. At this stage, the dispute could still have been resolved by a means other than confrontation, but with the promised inquiry never eventuating and local officials not interested in compromise, the government charted a course that could only result in warfare. By this time, Ngati Ranginui had no other option but to fight for their land. In respect of Taranaki, the Waitangi Tribunal stated that Maori had cause to consider, "in the circumstances of the time, that their best hope for keeping their homes, lands, and status lay in the assertion of arms." This comment is equally applicable to Tauranga at the beginning of 1867.

After the cessation of hostilities, the government force occupied redoubts at Judea and Gate Pa with most of the confiscated territory remaining under the authority of Ngati Ranginui. Survey parties still had to be protected by an armed guard while the few military settlers who stayed in the district were mostly unable or unwilling to move onto their farm sections. Moreover, the government decided not to place any discharged soldiers on land to the west of the Wairoa river. The government was eventually forced to admit that Ngati Ranginui still controlled the area surrounding Te Papa. As Clarke observed in March 1868, "these offenders cannot be apprehended without

disturbing the peace of the district, nor can it be expected that settlers will occupy those lands that have been allotted them, unless they are protected, or are allowed to devise extraordinary means for protecting themselves."<sup>271</sup>

#### 9.4 The New Zealand Wars and the Tauranga Bush Campaign

Belich has suggested that the nadir of Maori resistance during the New Zealand Wars was between 1864 and 1868. The war effort was less successful than in earlier or later wars because of the decisive role of kupapa troops, the emergence of the tactic of bush scouring, and the deterioration in Maori political cohesion.<sup>272</sup> He concluded that "the main reason for increased British success was that the decline in coherence and pragmatism of Maori resistance created an opportunity which the British were able to exploit through their valuable kupapa allies and their bush-scouring system." While the British deserved credit for exploiting the situation, a high price was paid by Maori: "across half the North Island, this new kind of war spread like a lethal blight, leaving violent death, starvation, and misery in its wake."<sup>273</sup>

Kupapa troops were not immediately deployed at the outbreak of the Tauranga Bush Campaign. The government initially thought that the 1st Waikato Regiment and the Auckland Volunteer Engineer Corps would be able to defeat the Pai Marire force without any outside assistance. "You may ask why I did not enrol the Arawas at once," Haultain told his ministerial colleague John Hall, "but I did not think it necessary to go to so much expense on account of 30 or 40 Hauhaus - whom I hoped to dispose of before a party could reach us from Maketu."<sup>274</sup> Kupapa troops were subsequently engaged by the government when an expected triumph failed to materialise and the enemy was rumoured to have received reinforcements.

There can be no doubt that the Te Arawa force was an important part of the colonial war effort and proved to be an effective unit during the fighting. These warriors took a leading role in the destruction of the extensive cultivations in the Kaimai ranges and plundered the settlements of Ngati Ranginui. However, the deployment of kupapa troops did not have a significant influence upon the eventual outcome of the Tauranga Bush Campaign. After all, the government failed to secure any sort of decisive victory both before and after the arrival of the Te Arawa force in Tauranga.

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<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Belich, *op.cit.*, pp.211-212.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid., p.216.

<sup>274</sup> Haultain to Hall, 26 January 1867, Stafford Papers, MS 2047, ATL.



According to Belich, bush scouring was only appropriate when the enemy was divided and fought without a strategic overview. Colonial troops would enter the bush and attack settlements, with Maori either fighting in a disorganised fashion from unsuitable positions or retreating from the area and suffering a heavy moral and economic blow.<sup>275</sup> However, bush scouring did not work when Maori followed a deliberate strategy and consistently applied the modern pa system. Belich concluded that between 1864 and 1868 "Maori resistance rarely had these characteristics, and bush-scouring was therefore effective."<sup>276</sup>

This model does not appear to be applicable to the Tauranga Bush Campaign. The hapu of Ngati Ranginui fought in a disciplined manner with the strategy of engaging the government force across an extended front for a prolonged period of time. Rather than fighting from a fortification, the favoured tactic was to stage a series of ambushes from commanding positions before withdrawing into the surrounding forest with the colonial troops in pursuit. By this method, the Pai Marire force, although small in number, was able to maintain an effective military operation for nearly three months. As one veteran recounted, "the enemy did not muster above 50 to 60 and they harassed fully 800 men for months."<sup>277</sup>

Although the hapu of Ngati Ranginui suffered a certain amount of economic misfortune, the destruction of their cultivations was not so complete as to totally remove their food supply, a situation that resulted from the fact that some of the crops were not ripe and the failure of the government force to gain complete control over the area. Despite suffering some casualties, the morale of the Pai Marire force does not appear to have been dented by the sacking of their villages. Indeed, these settlements were simply evacuated as necessary and then reoccupied after the colonial troops had returned to camp.

As noted above, Belich argued that one reason for the incoherence of Maori resistance was the absence of the leadership and resources of the Kingitanga. In the absence of this support, the war effort lacked cohesion and numbers, with local leaders unable to provide the necessary strategic direction. According to Belich, "this meant that Maori resistance took on a hand-to-mouth character, with people fighting for their own village and from hastily selected, hastily prepared positions."<sup>278</sup>

The military capacity of Ngati Ranginui was not necessarily weakened because there was little direct assistance from the Kingitanga in terms of both

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<sup>275</sup> Belich, op.cit., pp.214.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid., p.215.

<sup>277</sup> K Sinclair (ed), *A Soldier's View of Empire. The Reminiscences of James Bodell 1831-92*, London, 1982, p.166

<sup>278</sup> Belich, op.cit., pp.215.

individual commanders and additional men. The leaders of the Pai Marire force during the Tauranga Bush Campaign, chiefs such Rawiri Tata, Penetaka and Hakaraia, were not only veterans of the campaigns in Taranaki and Waikato, but also formed the high command of the Kingitanga in the Western Bay of Plenty. These men adopted strategies that were suitable for a relatively small number of warriors operating in rugged country, and there was no reversion to traditional tactics or misconceived defence of weak positions. Indeed, even with the undoubted engineering talents of Penetaka at their disposal, the Pai Marire force was not persuaded to adopt the modern pa system.

The Tauranga Bush Campaign was a crucial aspect of the relationship between Ngati Ranginui and the Crown during the nineteenth century. Contrary to the accounts of a generation of historians, the colonial troops under the command of gallant officers did not defeat a group of turbulent rebels led by deluded fanatics. As this report has demonstrated, Ngati Ranginui mounted a successful campaign characterised by appropriate tactics and astute leadership. At the conclusion of the Tauranga Bush Campaign, the authority of the government was restricted to the confines of Te Papa, with Ngati Ranginui retaining effective control over land on both sides of the Wairoa river. In other words, this area was still under the mana of the Kingitanga. Although this situation persisted for some time, the land remained confiscated according to the official documents, and with the inexorable spread of settlement in Tauranga, the various hapu would eventually be placed upon small reserves. In this sense, Ngati Ranginui won the war but lost the peace.